Fear of Reporting Bad News : Why Risk and Loss Aversion Can Tempt Top Executives to Create Information Asymmetry /

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Chakrabarty, Subrata (Author)
Other Authors:	Zardkoohi, Asghar (Thesis advisor)
Format:	Thesis eBook
Language:	English
Published:	[College Station, Texas] : [Texas A & M University], [2015]
Subjects:	Major Management. Compensation Quarterly reporting Annual reporting Inaccurate reporting Sarbanes Oxley Scandals Fraudulent reporting Fraud Manipulation CEO turnover Succession Economic crisis Financial crisis Credit crisis Event study OLS regression Tobin regression Tobit regression Logistic regression Matched sampling Interaction Disordinal Crossover Strategy Strategic management Management Competitive advantage Corporate governance Leadership Ethics Reporting Restatements Agency theory Prospect theory Institutional theory Information Asymmetry Moral hazard Adverse selection Loss aversion Risk Firm specific risk Unsystematic risk Default risk Bankruptcy risk Credit Creditors Debt Debtors Top Management Top executive CEO Ownership Institutional ownership Institutional ownership concentration Institutional regulations Public policy Stock options In the money
Online Access:	Link to OAK Trust copy

Link to OAK Trust copy

Available Online