| Summary: | "The supposed wants of harmony between Probability and other branches of Philosophy is erroneous. It arises from the belief that Probability is a branch of mathematics trying to intrude itself on to ground which does not altogether belong to it. I shall endeavour to show that this belief is unfounded. With what may be called the Material view of Logic as opposed to the Formal or Conceptualist, --with that which regards it as taking cognizance of laws of things and not of the laws of our own minds in thinking about things, --I am in entire accordance. Of the province of Logic, regarded from this point of view, and under its widest aspect, Probability may, in my opinion, be considered to be a portion. The principal objects of this Essay are to ascertain how great a portion it comprises, where we are to draw the boundary between it and the contiguous branches of the general science of evidence, what are the ultimate foundations upon which its rules rest, what the nature of the evidence they are capable of affording, and to what class of subjects they may most fitly be applied. That the science of Probability, on this view of it, contains something more important than the results of a system of mathematical assumptions, is obvious. I am convinced moreover that it can and ought to be rendered both interesting and intelligible to ordinary readers who have any taste for philosophy"--Preface. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
|
|---|