Functional safety from scratch : a practical guide to process industry applications /

Functional safety is the task of developing and implementing automatic safety systems used to manage risks in many industries where hazardous processes and machinery are used. Functional Safety from Scratch: A Practical Guide to Process Industry Applications provides a practical guide to functional...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Clarke, Peter (Author)
Corporate Author: ScienceDirect (Online service)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Amsterdam : Elsevier, 2023.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Front Cover
  • Functional Safety from Scratch
  • Functional Safety from Scratch
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • About the author
  • Acknowledgements
  • Abbreviations
  • Glossary
  • Introduction
  • Which industries are covered?
  • Who is the book suitable for?
  • Who developed this book?
  • 1
  • Introduction to functional safety
  • 1.1 What could possibly go wrong?
  • 1.2 Hazard and risk
  • 1.2.1 What is a hazard?
  • 1.2.2 What is harm?
  • 1.2.3 What is risk?
  • 1.2.4 What is tolerable risk?
  • 1.2.5 Risk management through functional safety
  • 1.3 Functional safety standards: IEC 61508 and IEC 61511
  • 1.3.1 Purpose of the standards
  • 1.3.2 Scope of IEC 61511
  • 1.3.3 Why comply with IEC 61511?
  • 1.4 IEC 61511 key concepts
  • 1.4.1 The functional safety lifecycle
  • 1.4.2 Intrinsically safer design
  • 1.4.3 The safety requirements specification (SRS)
  • 1.4.4 Assuring that functional safety is achieved
  • 1.4.5 Random and systematic failures
  • 1.4.6 Competency
  • 1.5 The structure of IEC 61511
  • 1.6 The origins of IEC 61511
  • Exercises
  • Answers
  • Question 1-Answer
  • Question 2-Answer
  • Question 4-Answer
  • References
  • Further reading
  • 2
  • Basic terminology: SIF, SIS and SIL
  • 2.1 The meaning of SIF, SIS and SIL
  • 2.1.1 What is a SIF?
  • 2.1.2 What is a SIS?
  • 2.1.3 SIL, reliability, and integrity
  • 2.1.4 What is an interlock (or trip)?
  • 2.2 Anatomy of a SIF
  • 2.2.1 The sensor subsystem
  • Other components of the sensor subsystem
  • The MooN concept for initiators
  • 2.2.2 The logic solver subsystem
  • 2.2.3 The final element subsystem
  • Actuated valves
  • Motor control circuits
  • Other final elements
  • Other elements of the final element subsystem
  • The MooN concept for final elements
  • 2.2.4 Permissives and inhibit functions
  • 2.2.5 Other important aspects of a SIF
  • 2.3 Development of a SIF
  • 2.3.1 SIL assessment.
  • 2.3.2 SIL verification
  • 2.4 Failure
  • 2.4.1 Failure modes
  • 2.4.2 Failure rates
  • 2.4.3 Hardware fault tolerance
  • Exercises
  • Answers
  • Question 1-Answer
  • Question 2-Answer
  • Question 3-Answer
  • Question 4-Answer
  • Question 5-Answer
  • Question 6-Answer
  • Question 7-Answer
  • Question 8-Answer
  • References
  • 3
  • Risk evaluation
  • 3.1 Identifying hazardous scenarios
  • 3.2 Expressing risk in numbers
  • 3.3 Tolerable risk
  • Defining a tolerable risk per event
  • Defining a total tolerable risk per risk receptor
  • 3.4 How much precision is needed?
  • 3.5 The ALARP concept
  • Exercises
  • Answers
  • Question 1-Answer
  • Question 2-Answer
  • Question 3-Answer
  • References
  • 4
  • Introduction to SIL assessment
  • 4.1 Safety instrumented function (SIF) operating modes
  • 4.1.1 What are low demand, high demand and continuous modes?
  • 4.1.2 Selecting an operating mode
  • 4.1.3 Formal definition of operating modes
  • 4.1.4 The significance of operating modes
  • Definition of SIL
  • Failure rates
  • SIL assessment methodology
  • 4.1.5 Tips on selecting the operating mode
  • 4.2 The objectives of SIL assessment
  • 4.2.1 Low demand mode SIFs
  • 4.2.2 High demand and continuous mode SIFs
  • 4.2.3 Why not use default SIL targets?
  • 4.2.4 Prevention or mitigation?
  • 4.3 Identifying and documenting SIFs
  • 4.3.1 Objective
  • 4.3.2 Using process control narratives, interlock descriptions
  • 4.3.3 Using cause &amp
  • effect diagrams (C&amp
  • EDs)
  • 4.3.4 Using HAZOP and old SIL assessment study reports
  • Should BPCS trips be included?
  • 4.3.5 Using binary logic diagrams
  • 4.3.6 Using interlock logic diagrams
  • 4.3.7 Using piping &amp
  • instrumentation diagrams (P&amp
  • IDs)
  • 4.4 Separating complex interlocks into SIFs
  • 4.5 The double jeopardy rule
  • 4.6 Independent protection layers
  • 4.6.1 Pressure relief devices (PRDs).
  • 4.6.2 Alarms with operator response
  • 4.6.3 Control loops
  • 4.6.4 Autostart of standby equipment
  • 4.6.5 BPCS interlocks
  • 4.6.6 Interlocks in other PLCs
  • 4.6.7 Check valves
  • 4.6.8 Other mechanical protective devices
  • 4.6.9 Operating procedures
  • 4.6.10 Spill containment
  • 4.6.11 Trace heating
  • 4.6.12 Backup utility supplies
  • 4.6.13 Another SIF
  • 4.6.14 Typical IPL credit available
  • 4.6.15 Examples of insufficient independence
  • 4.7 Critical common element analysis
  • Exercises
  • Answers
  • Question 1-Answer
  • Question 2-Answer
  • Question 3-Answer
  • Question 4-Answer
  • Question 5-Answer
  • Question 6-Answer
  • Question 7-Answer
  • Question 8-Answer
  • Question 9-Answer
  • Question 10-Answer
  • Question 11-Answer
  • Question 12-Answer
  • Question 13-Answer
  • References
  • 5
  • SIL assessment methodology
  • 5.1 Introduction
  • 5.2 Overview of SIL assessment methods
  • Features of SIL assessment common to all methods
  • 5.3 Selecting initiating events
  • Typical initiating events
  • Determine the initiating event in sufficient detail
  • Control loop malfunctions
  • Failure of safeguards as initiating events
  • 5.4 Assessing the likelihood of initiating events
  • 5.5 Assessing the consequence severity
  • 5.6 Documenting the SIL assessment study
  • 5.7 Risk matrix method
  • 5.7.1 Method overview
  • 5.7.2 Likelihood and severity categories
  • 5.7.3 The risk matrix
  • 5.7.4 Calibration of the risk matrix
  • 5.7.5 Handling multiple initiating events
  • 5.7.6 Handling enabling conditions and conditional modifiers
  • 5.7.7 Handling independent protection layers (IPLs)
  • 5.7.8 Estimating the SIF demand rate
  • 5.7.9 Risk matrix and ALARP
  • 5.7.10 High demand and continuous mode SIFs
  • 5.8 Risk Graph method
  • 5.8.1 Method overview
  • 5.8.2 Parameters used in Risk Graph
  • 5.8.3 Risk Graph examples.
  • 5.8.4 Selecting parameter categories
  • Demand frequency (W parameter)
  • Exposure (F parameter)
  • Avoidance (P parameter)
  • 5.8.5 Calibration of the Risk Graph
  • 5.8.6 Handling multiple initiating events
  • 5.8.7 Handling enabling conditions and conditional modifiers
  • 5.8.8 Handling independent protection layers (IPLs)
  • 5.8.9 Estimating the SIF demand rate
  • 5.8.10 High demand and continuous mode SIFs
  • 5.9 Layer of protection analysis (LOPA)
  • 5.9.1 Method overview
  • 5.9.2 Enabling conditions
  • 5.9.3 Conditional modifiers
  • 5.9.4 Handling multiple initiating events
  • 5.9.5 Estimating the SIF demand rate
  • 5.9.6 Example LOPA worksheet
  • 5.9.7 High demand and continuous mode SIFs
  • 5.10 Fault tree analysis
  • 5.10.1 Method overview
  • 5.10.2 Documenting Fault Tree analysis
  • 5.11 Cost/benefit analysis
  • 5.11.1 Introduction
  • 5.11.2 Calculating the cost of the outcome
  • Example
  • 5.11.3 Calculating the cost of the SIF
  • 5.11.4 Selecting the optimal solution
  • 5.12 The SIL assessment workshop
  • 5.12.1 The SIL assessment team
  • 5.12.2 Overall objectives of the SIL assessment workshop
  • Exercises
  • Answers
  • Question 1-Answer
  • Question 2-Answer
  • Question 3-Answer
  • Question 4-Answer
  • Question 5-Answer
  • Question 6-Answer
  • Question 7-Answer
  • Question 8-Answer
  • Question 9-Answer
  • Question 10-Answer
  • Question 11-Answer
  • Question 12-Answer
  • Question 13-Answer
  • Question 14-Answer
  • Question 15-Answer
  • Question 16-Answer
  • Question 17-Answer
  • Question 18-Answer
  • References
  • 6
  • SIL assessment: special topics
  • 6.1 Redundant initiators
  • Handling redundant initiators
  • 6.2 Redundant safety functions
  • What determines if two SIFs are redundant?
  • One SIF as backup to another
  • Redundant SIFs in low risk situations
  • 6.3 One SIF-two hazards
  • 6.4 The IPLs vary depending on demand case.
  • 6.5 The demand case is activation of another SIF
  • 6.6 One SIF cascades to another
  • 6.7 Initiating event involves multiple simultaneous failures
  • Example 1
  • Example 2
  • 6.8 Permissives
  • Demand frequency
  • Defining physical initiators and final elements
  • 6.9 Multiple sensors distributed across a wide area
  • 6.10 Operator action as initiator
  • 6.11 Duty and standby pumps
  • Variable number of pumps running
  • Duty pump switchover
  • 6.12 Alarms from cascade control loops
  • 6.13 Final elements are shared between the basic process control system (BPCS) and the SIS
  • 6.14 Selecting primary final elements
  • 6.14.1 Introduction
  • 6.14.2 The safe state
  • 6.14.3 Selecting primary final elements
  • Exercises
  • Answers
  • Question 1-Answer
  • Question 2-Answer
  • Question 3-Answer
  • Question 4-Answer
  • Question 5-Answer
  • Question 6-Answer
  • Question 7-Answer
  • Question 8-Answer
  • Question 9-Answer
  • Reference
  • 7
  • Key functional safety documents
  • 7.1 The how and why of documentation
  • 7.2 The functional safety management plan
  • 7.2.1 Introduction
  • 7.2.1 Introduction
  • 7.2.2 The functional safety lifecycle
  • 7.2.2 The functional safety lifecycle
  • What information is needed for each lifecycle phase?
  • 7.2.3 Management of change and configuration management
  • 7.2.3 Management of change and configuration management
  • Management of change
  • Configuration management
  • 7.2.4 Management requirements in the FSMP
  • 7.2.4 Management requirements in the FSMP
  • Overall planning
  • Document management
  • Competency management
  • Action item management
  • Contractor management
  • SIL capability management
  • Assurance planning
  • 7.2.5 Why the FSMP is important
  • 7.2.5 Why the FSMP is important
  • 7.3 The Safety Requirements Specification (SRS)
  • 7.3.1 Introduction
  • 7.3.1 Introduction
  • 7.3.2 What is the purpose of the SRS?.