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Law and economics of vertical integration and control
Front Cover; Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; Acknowledgments; Chapter 1. Introduction; Background; Purpose of Present Study; Standard for Analysis; PART I: Economics of Vertical Control; Chapter 2. Transaction Costs; The Incentive to Integrate; The Welfare Effects; Transaction Cost Determinants; Advantages and Limitations of Internal Transfers; Contractual Alternatives; Chapter 3. Fixed Proportions and Contractual Alternatives; No Incentive for Vertical Control; Successive Monopoly; Important Product-Specific Services; Entry Barriers.
Chapter 4. Variable Proportions and Contractual AlternativesOwnership Integration; Tying Arrangements; Output Royalties; Sales Revenue Royalties; Lump-Sum Entry Fees; Vertical Controls: Problems in Practice; Conclusion; Chapter 5. Vertical Integration under Uncertainty; Early Studies; More Recent Studies; Random Demand; Random Input Prices; Chapter 6. Vertical Integration without Contractual Alternatives; Regulation and Vertical Integration; Monopsony and Vertical Integration; Price Discrimination and Vertical Integration; Vertical Integration and Downstream Disequilibrium.
Appendix: A Formal Analysis of Vertical Integration and Downstream DisequilibriumPART II: Legal Analysis of Vertical Control; Chapter 7. Legal Treatment of Ownership Integration; Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act; Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 1968; Market Foreclosure Doctrine; The 1982 Merger Guidelines; Concluding Remarks; Chapter 8. Per Se Illegal Contractual Controls; Fixing Maximum-Resale Prices; Resale Price Maintenance; Tying Arrangements; Public Policy Assessment; Chapter 9. Contractual Controls That Are Not Illegal Per Se; Introduction; Presumptively Legal Controls.
Exclusive Dealing and Requirements ContractsTerritorial Restraints; Concluding Remarks; Part III: Public Policy Analysis; Chapter 10. Conclusion; Alternative Legal Rules; Appropriate Antitrust Policy; Areas for Future Research; Epilogue; Bibliography; Index.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 197-203) and index.
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