Game theory : mathematical models of conflict /

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jones, A. J. (Antonia Jane), 1943-
Corporate Author: ScienceDirect (Online service)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Chichester [England] : Horwood Pub., 2000.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • The name of the game
  • Extensive Forms And Pure Strategies
  • Normal Forms And Saddle Points
  • Mixed Strategies And The Minimax Theorem
  • Dominance Of Strategies
  • 2 x n And Symmetric Games
  • Other Kinds Of Two Person Zero Sum Games
  • Non-cooperative Games
  • Extensive Forms And Equilibrium N-Tuples
  • Normal Forms And Mixed Strategy Equlibria
  • Discussion Of Equilibria
  • Preliminary Results For 2-Person Zero Sum Games
  • The Minimax Theorem For Matrix Games
  • Properties Of Matrix Games
  • Simplified 2-Person Poker
  • Continuous Games On The Unit Square
  • Linear Programming and Matrix Games
  • Preliminary Results
  • Duality Theory
  • The Geometric Situation
  • Extreme Points Of The Feasible Region
  • The Shapley-Snow Procedure For Games
  • Mixed Constraints, Slack Variables, And The Tableau
  • The Pivot Operation
  • Artificial Variables
  • Cooperative games
  • Utilities And Scales Of Measurement
  • Characteristic Functions
  • Imputations
  • Strategic Equivalence
  • Dominance Of Imputations
  • von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions
  • The Edgeworth Trading Model
  • The Shapley Value
  • Bargaining Models
  • Graphical Representation Of Games And Status Quo Points
  • The Nash Bargaining Model
  • The Threat Game
  • Shapley And Nash Solutions For Bimatrix Games
  • Other Bargaining Models
  • Fixed Point Theorems.