Sentencing discretion and the constitution : due process of time /
This text addresses the fundamental incompatibility of the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to the sentencing power of judges as compared to prosecutors. The Court says that when prosecutors induce a guilty plea by filing lesser charges than the code allows, the defendant is getting a break rather...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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New York, NY :
Oxford University Press,
[2026]
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| Series: | Oxford monographs on criminal law and criminal justice.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
| Summary: | This text addresses the fundamental incompatibility of the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to the sentencing power of judges as compared to prosecutors. The Court says that when prosecutors induce a guilty plea by filing lesser charges than the code allows, the defendant is getting a break rather than being strong-armed. This doctrinal fiction persists because neither dissenting justices nor academic critics have yet justified a baseline by which the infliction of years - or even decades - in prison for refusing to plead guilty or to provide information, should be treated as a coercive threat rather than an offer permitted in the 'give and take' of plea bargaining. In theory, the charges filed should be proportional to culpability, not the most severe the code permits. This raises another hard problem: theorists have not to date advanced a persuasive account of proportionate punishment. |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource. |
| Audience: | Specialized. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780197830390 0197830390 |