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The empathetic emotions in the history of philosophy /

This volume is concerned with theories of emotions that can be described as empathetic ones, either because they presuppose the human capacity for empathy or because they are essential to how empathy operates. Explores how philosophers have understood these emotions throughout the history of philoso...

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Bibliographic Details
Other Authors: Ansell-Pearson, Keith, 1960- (Editor), James, David, 1966- (Editor)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2025]
Subjects:
Emotions (Philosophy) > History.
Émotions (Philosophie) > Histoire.
Ethics & Moral Philosophy.
PHILOSOPHY.
Mind & Body.
Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge.
Philosophy.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Half Title
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Contents
  • List of Contributors
  • Introduction
  • Abbreviations
  • References
  • 1 The Early History of 'Natural' Sympathy: Contagious Affect and Universal Kinship in the Hellenistic Mediterranean
  • 1.1 A Prolegomenon to Ancient Sympathy
  • 1.2 The Early Evidence for Sympathy as Pity
  • 1.3 The Risks of 'Tragic' Sympathizing
  • 5.4 On the Nature of Sympathy
  • Acknowledgements
  • Abbreviations
  • 2 Between Inhumane Detachment and the Darker Sides of Empathy: Stoicism on the Empathetic Emotions (including Pity)
  • 2.1 Martha Nussbaum and the Pitiless, Detached Stoics
  • 2.2 The Sympathetic eupatheia and Stoic philostourgia
  • 2.3 Un-detached: the Theoretical Bases of Stoic Interconnectedness
  • 2.4 Stoic Cognitive and Sympathetic Empathy in Practice: the Defence of a Different Kind of Pity in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius
  • 2.4.1 Cultivating cognitive empathy (sense i) as a counter to anger at others
  • 2.4.2 Sympathetic empathy (sense iii)-eumenia (benevolence) and pity (eleos), as optimal Stoic responses to others' bad intentions
  • 2.5 Conclusion: Stoic Empathy, This Side of the Dark Side of Empathy
  • 5 From Evil, Useless Pity to Active Empathy or generositas: Empathetic Emotions in Spinoza's Ethics
  • 5.1 Introduction
  • 5.2 Introducing Spinozistic Empathy
  • 5.2.1 The Mechanism of Empathy: Imitation of the Affects
  • 5.2.2 Empathetic Emotions Proper-Empathic Concern
  • 5.3 The Ethical-Social Value of Empathetic Emotions
  • 5.3.1 Spinoza's Rejection of Empathetic Passions
  • 5.3.2 Virtuous Other-Directed Affects
  • 5.3.3 The Virtuous Nature of Empathetic Passions Reconsidered
  • 5.4 Cultivating Active Imitation and Virtuous Empathetic Emotions
  • 5.4.1 Adequate Ideas and Active Affects Against Imitation of Passions
  • 5.4.2 Constancy and Imitation of Active Affects
  • 5.4.3 Spiritual Exercises for Checking the Imitation of Passions and Reinforcing Nobility
  • 5.5 Conclusion
  • Bibliography
  • 6 Hume on Sympathy, Humanity, and the Passions
  • 6.1 How Sympathy Works
  • 6.2 Sympathetic Reverberations and the Enhancement of Passionate Experience
  • 6.3 Sympathy, Comparison, and Human Vulnerability
  • 6.4 Sympathy as the Source of Moral Sentiments
  • Abbreviations
  • References
  • 7 Rousseau on the Natural Goodness of Pity