The European Commission's toleration of noncompliance with EU law : a guardian with two faces /

EU law is widely recognised as the backbone of European integration. As 'the Guardian of the Treaties', the European Commission is expected to enforce EU law relentlessly and meticulously. Noncompliance by Member States, however, is not always prosecuted by the supranational guardian; inst...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Zhang, Yaning (Political scientist) (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2025]
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Description
Summary:EU law is widely recognised as the backbone of European integration. As 'the Guardian of the Treaties', the European Commission is expected to enforce EU law relentlessly and meticulously. Noncompliance by Member States, however, is not always prosecuted by the supranational guardian; instead, supranational enforcement by the Commission is known to be selective and strategic. In this book, Yaning Zhang argues that such forbearance is driven by divergent enforcement rationales. He assumes that the Commission, when enforcing EU law, is a hybrid institution of a political agent and a judicial trustee.
Abstract:"This book explores the reasons why the European Commission, as the guardian of the EU treaties, purposely tolerates noncompliance with EU law by member states. To uncover this sensitive and invisible phenomenon, this research first develops an effective conceptualization strategy that defines, illustrates, and captures toleration of noncompliance (ToN). The existing compliance literature mainly looks for explanations from peculiarities of member states, policy sectors, and legal rules. Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to the supranational prosecutor. To close this theoretical gap, this study shifts the focus to the institutional nature of the Commission. Viewing the Commission as an institutional hybrid of a political agent and a judicial trustee, this book theorizes that enforcement incentives derived from the dual institutional facets jointly lead to a typology of enforcement forbearance. Based on four in-depth case studies covering diverse policy areas (public health, defence, migration and asylum, transport) and different member states (Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Germany), this book demonstrates that enforcement forbearance can be used by the Commission to suppress the inherent deficiencies of EU law (altruistic ToN) or as a quid pro quo to advance the Commission's policy agenda (egocentric ToN). When both types of logic are at play, ToN works simultaneously as a ‘painkiller' and a policy ‘catalyst' (active ToN). Lastly, ToN can also be exploited to deal with domestic political crises of member states. Drawing on the findings of the case studies, this book concludes that the legitimacy of ToN is very diverse concerning different types of ToN"-- Oxford Academic.
Physical Description:1 online resource : illustrations
Audience:Specialized.
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:019892111X
9780198921110
0198921101
9780198921097
0198921098
9780198921103