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Phenomenal properties and the intuition of distinctness : the view from the inside /

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This title explores the question of whether the phenomenal properties of our experiences (what those experiences are like for us) can be anything over and above our physical properties (those properties that are attributed to us by the descriptions of us that the empirical sciences produce).

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Melnyk, Andrew, 1962- (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2025]
Subjects:
Qualia.
Experience.
Sense (Philosophy)
Materialism.
Expérience.
Sensibilité (Philosophie)
Matérialisme.
materialism (philosophical movement)
Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge.
Philosophy.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Half Title
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Dedication
  • Acknowledgments
  • Contents
  • 1 Introduction
  • 1.1 The Main Question
  • 1.2 Preview of the Book
  • 2 The Intuition of Distinctness and Some of Its Manifestations
  • 2.1 Three Puzzling Quotations
  • 2.2 The Intuition of Revelation
  • 2.3 The "Explanatory Gap" Argument
  • 2.4 The Knowledge Argument
  • 2.5 The Zombie Argument
  • 2.6 Conclusion
  • 3 Why Not Take the Intuition of Distinctness at Face Value?
  • 3.1 The Chapter's Main Argument Outlined
  • 3.2 Not Seeming Physical or Functional
  • 3.3 Digression: A Philosophers' Argument
  • 3.4 Not Having a Spatial Location
  • 3.5 Not Seeming to Have a Spatial Location
  • 3.6 Phenomenal Features of Phenomenal Properties
  • 3.7 The Homogeneity of Phenomenal Properties
  • 3.8 The Directness of Phenomenal Knowledge
  • 3.9 Infallible Phenomenal Knowledge?
  • 3.10 Subjectivity
  • 3.11 Non-conscious Mechanisms
  • 3.12 Conclusion
  • 4 Previous Accounts of the Intuition of Distinctness
  • 4.1 A Critical Survey
  • 4.2 Armstrong
  • 4.3 Lycan
  • 4.4 Papineau
  • 4.5 Robbins and Jack
  • 4.6 Fiala, Arico, and Nichols
  • 4.7 Elpidorou and Dove
  • 4.8 Molyneux
  • 4.9 Sundström
  • 4.10 Conclusion
  • 5 What, Then, Does Account for the Intuition of Distinctness?
  • 5.1 Rehearsal of Defective Arguments?
  • 5.2 The Novel Explanation Introduced
  • 5.3 Introspection's Conceptual Encapsulation
  • 5.4 Believing an Identity Claim
  • 5.5 The Novel Explanation Elaborated
  • 5.6 Some Objections
  • 5.6.1 Churchland's Suggestion
  • 5.6.2 Deepening the Explanation
  • 5.6.3 Predicting What Isn't
  • 5.7 Conclusion
  • References
  • Index.