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Oxford studies in normative ethics. Volume 14 /

'Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics' is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers advance our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing normative theories to questions of how we should act and live well. It...

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Bibliographic Details
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2024]
Series:Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Series.
Subjects:
Normativity (Ethics)
Norme (Morale)
Ethics & moral philosophy.
Philosophy.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgments
  • List of Contributors
  • Introduction
  • 1: How Do Personal Relationships Make a Moral Difference?
  • 2: Prudence, Beneficence, and Time
  • 1. Time-NeutralPrudence
  • 2. Time-RelativePrudence
  • 3. The Connection between Prudence and Beneficence
  • 4. World-RelativePrudence
  • 5. Conclusion
  • Appendix: Clarifying the Link
  • References
  • 3: Temperance, Continence, Weakness, Indulgence, Compulsion
  • 1. Introduction and Intemperance
  • 2. A Gloss on Temperance
  • 3. Weakness of Will
  • 4. Continence
  • 5. A Model of Temperance
  • 4: The All or Nothing Ranking Reversal and the Unity of Morality
  • 1. Morally Better
  • 1.1. Supererogation is Better
  • 1.2. Morally Better as Morally More Choiceworthy
  • 1.3. Right > Wrong
  • 2. Moral Commending Weight
  • 2.1. The Basic Concept
  • 2.2. Commending vs. Justifying and Requiring Weight
  • 3. The All or Nothing Problem for Pairwise Precedence
  • 3.1. The All or Nothing Verdicts
  • 3.2. Pairwise Precedence
  • 4. All or Nothing Ranking Reversal Explained
  • 4.1. Deontic Precedence
  • 4.2. Two-OptionVerdict Explained
  • 4.3. Three-OptionVerdict Explained
  • 5. The Unity of Morality
  • 6. Conflicting Intuitions?
  • 7. The Unity Explained
  • References
  • 5: Hypocrisy as Two-Faced
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Attitudinal Hypocrisy
  • 3. Attitudinal Hypocrisy Is Blameworthy
  • 4. Behavioral Hypocrisy
  • 5. The Janus-FacedStructure of the Vice of Hypocrisy
  • 6. Existing Accounts
  • 7. Conclusion
  • References
  • 6: Hybrid Goods
  • 1. The Character of Hybrid Goods
  • 2. Grass Counting in Context
  • 3. Friendship
  • 4. Engagement with Incommensurable Goods
  • 7: Explanatory Pluralism in Normative Ethics
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. 'Normative', 'Explanation', and 'Pluralism'
  • 3. Two Normative Explanatory Monisms
  • 4. Why Pluralism?
  • 5. Too Many Types of Explanation?
  • 6. One Type to Rule Them All?
  • 7. Not a Genuine Pluralism?
  • References
  • 8: Value in the Mere Shape of Episodes
  • Forks on the Left, Knives on the Right
  • First Course: Location
  • Second Course: Substance
  • Third Course: Scope
  • Dessert
  • References
  • 9: Worlds Collided: Love as Seeing and Seeing-With
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Love as Seeing
  • 3. Love as Seeing-With
  • 4. The Beloved as Another Subjectivity
  • 5. Love's Difficulties