Wealth, power, and authoritarian institutions : comparing dominant parties and parliaments in Tanzania and Uganda /
Through an analysis of the recent political history of Tanzania and Uganda, 'Wealth, Power, and Authoritarian Institutions' offers a novel explanation of why authoritarian parties and legislatures vary in strength, and why this variation matters.
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
[2024]
|
| Series: | Oxford studies in African politics and international relations.
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
Table of Contents:
- Cover
- Title page
- Copyright page
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
- 1 Introduction
- 1.1 The Argument
- 1.2 Contributions of the Argument
- 1.3 Research Design
- 1.4 Plan of the Book
- 2 Wealth, Power, and Authoritarian Institutions
- 2.1 Towards an Analysis of Authoritarian Institutions
- 2.1.1 Authoritarian Institutions in Comparative Research
- 2.1.2 An Alternative Political Economy Approach
- 2.2 A Theory of Political Institutions in Africa
- 2.2.1 Two Authoritarian Party Ideal Types
- 2.2.2 Capitalist Development, 'Politicized Accumulation', and Party Trajectories
- 2.2.3 From Party to Parliament
- 2.3 Conclusion
- 3 Authoritarian Party Consolidation
- 3.1 Argument and Methods
- 3.2 Post-Independence Regimes
- 3.2.1 Tanzania-Consolidation of an 'Institutionalized Coalition'
- 3.2.2 Kenya-Consolidation of a 'Bargained Coalition'
- 3.3 Post-'Liberation' Regimes
- 3.3.1 Uganda-Consolidation of a 'Bargained Coalition'
- 3.3.2 Rwanda-Consolidation of an 'Institutionalized Coalition'
- 3.4 Conclusion
- 4 Authoritarian Party Trajectories
- 4.1 Argument and Methods
- 4.2 Chama Cha Mapinduzi, a Strong Party in Decline
- 4.2.1 Changing Patterns of Wealth Accumulation
- 4.2.2 CCM's Institutional Erosion
- 4.2.3 Presidential Succession and Its Discontents
- 4.2.4 Evaluating the Role of Opposition Pressures
- 4.3 The National Resistance Movement, a Weak Party with Ambitions
- 4.3.1 Policing the Rich
- 4.3.2 Party-Building, or Not
- 4.3.3 Party Politics and the Presidency for Life
- 4.3.4 Evaluating the Role of Opposition Pressures
- 4.4 Conclusion
- 5 Legislative Institutional Strength
- 5.1 Argument and Methods
- 5.1.1 Legislative Strength, What Is It?
- 5.1.2 How Legislative Institutions Strengthen
- 5.1.3 Alternative Explanations
- 5.1.4 Comparing Tanzania and Uganda
- 5.2 Tanzania's Bunge
- 5.2.1 A Party Strengthens, a Parliament Declines
- 5.2.2 Parliament Begins, Slowly, to Strengthen
- 5.2.3 'Bunge Lenye Meno', a Parliament with Teeth
- 5.3 Uganda's Parliament
- 5.3.1 Parliament and the Promise of 'Fundamental Change'
- 5.3.2 Parliament Asserts Itself
- 5.3.3 The Executive Backlash
- 5.3.4 The Tug-of-War Continues
- 5.4 Conclusion
- 6 Legislative Influence
- 6.1 Argument and Methods
- 6.1.1 Explaining Legislative Performance and Its Significance
- 6.1.2 Assessing Legislative Influence
- 6.2 The Fall and Rise of Tanzania's Parliament
- 6.2.1 An Historical Overview of Legislative Performance
- 6.2.2 Tanzania's 'Parliamentary Business Cycle'
- 6.2.3 Elite Contestation, Legislative Activism, and Distributive Politics
- 6.3 The Continued Assertiveness of Uganda's Parliament
- 6.3.1 An Overview of Legislative Performance
- 6.3.2 Uganda's 'Parliamentary Business Cycle'
- 6.3.3 Case Studies-Elite Contestation Meets `Mass-Based' Organizing
- 6.4 Conclusion
- 7 Conclusion