Wealth, power, and authoritarian institutions : comparing dominant parties and parliaments in Tanzania and Uganda /

Through an analysis of the recent political history of Tanzania and Uganda, 'Wealth, Power, and Authoritarian Institutions' offers a novel explanation of why authoritarian parties and legislatures vary in strength, and why this variation matters.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Collord, Michaela, 1991- (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2024]
Series:Oxford studies in African politics and international relations.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Title page
  • Copyright page
  • Preface and Acknowledgements
  • Contents
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
  • 1 Introduction
  • 1.1 The Argument
  • 1.2 Contributions of the Argument
  • 1.3 Research Design
  • 1.4 Plan of the Book
  • 2 Wealth, Power, and Authoritarian Institutions
  • 2.1 Towards an Analysis of Authoritarian Institutions
  • 2.1.1 Authoritarian Institutions in Comparative Research
  • 2.1.2 An Alternative Political Economy Approach
  • 2.2 A Theory of Political Institutions in Africa
  • 2.2.1 Two Authoritarian Party Ideal Types
  • 2.2.2 Capitalist Development, 'Politicized Accumulation', and Party Trajectories
  • 2.2.3 From Party to Parliament
  • 2.3 Conclusion
  • 3 Authoritarian Party Consolidation
  • 3.1 Argument and Methods
  • 3.2 Post-Independence Regimes
  • 3.2.1 Tanzania-Consolidation of an 'Institutionalized Coalition'
  • 3.2.2 Kenya-Consolidation of a 'Bargained Coalition'
  • 3.3 Post-'Liberation' Regimes
  • 3.3.1 Uganda-Consolidation of a 'Bargained Coalition'
  • 3.3.2 Rwanda-Consolidation of an 'Institutionalized Coalition'
  • 3.4 Conclusion
  • 4 Authoritarian Party Trajectories
  • 4.1 Argument and Methods
  • 4.2 Chama Cha Mapinduzi, a Strong Party in Decline
  • 4.2.1 Changing Patterns of Wealth Accumulation
  • 4.2.2 CCM's Institutional Erosion
  • 4.2.3 Presidential Succession and Its Discontents
  • 4.2.4 Evaluating the Role of Opposition Pressures
  • 4.3 The National Resistance Movement, a Weak Party with Ambitions
  • 4.3.1 Policing the Rich
  • 4.3.2 Party-Building, or Not
  • 4.3.3 Party Politics and the Presidency for Life
  • 4.3.4 Evaluating the Role of Opposition Pressures
  • 4.4 Conclusion
  • 5 Legislative Institutional Strength
  • 5.1 Argument and Methods
  • 5.1.1 Legislative Strength, What Is It?
  • 5.1.2 How Legislative Institutions Strengthen
  • 5.1.3 Alternative Explanations
  • 5.1.4 Comparing Tanzania and Uganda
  • 5.2 Tanzania's Bunge
  • 5.2.1 A Party Strengthens, a Parliament Declines
  • 5.2.2 Parliament Begins, Slowly, to Strengthen
  • 5.2.3 'Bunge Lenye Meno', a Parliament with Teeth
  • 5.3 Uganda's Parliament
  • 5.3.1 Parliament and the Promise of 'Fundamental Change'
  • 5.3.2 Parliament Asserts Itself
  • 5.3.3 The Executive Backlash
  • 5.3.4 The Tug-of-War Continues
  • 5.4 Conclusion
  • 6 Legislative Influence
  • 6.1 Argument and Methods
  • 6.1.1 Explaining Legislative Performance and Its Significance
  • 6.1.2 Assessing Legislative Influence
  • 6.2 The Fall and Rise of Tanzania's Parliament
  • 6.2.1 An Historical Overview of Legislative Performance
  • 6.2.2 Tanzania's 'Parliamentary Business Cycle'
  • 6.2.3 Elite Contestation, Legislative Activism, and Distributive Politics
  • 6.3 The Continued Assertiveness of Uganda's Parliament
  • 6.3.1 An Overview of Legislative Performance
  • 6.3.2 Uganda's 'Parliamentary Business Cycle'
  • 6.3.3 Case Studies-Elite Contestation Meets `Mass-Based' Organizing
  • 6.4 Conclusion
  • 7 Conclusion