Transparency and reflection : a study of self-knowledge and the nature of mind /
"This book argues that we misunderstand the importance of the topic of self-knowledge if we conceive of it merely as a puzzle about how we can know a special range of facts. Instead, we should regard it as an inducement to reflect on the nature of the relevant facts themselves, and of the kind...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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New York, NY :
Oxford University Press,
[2024]
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
Table of Contents:
- Cover
- Transparency and Reflection
- Copyright
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- I.1. Why Study Self-Knowledge?
- I.2. Self-Knowledge and the First-Person Perspective
- I.3. The Stakes in These Debates
- I.4. Epistemic versus Metaphysical Approaches to Self-Knowledge
- I.5. Kantian versus Sartrean Conceptions of Self-Consciousness
- I.6. Plan of the Chapters
- Part I: Self-Knowledge and Transparency
- 1. Transparency and Other Problems
- 1.1. Introduction
- 1.2. Standard Formulations
- 1.3. Three Observations about Self-Knowledge
- 1.4. Generalizing the Problem of Transparency
- 1.5. Conclusion and Prospect
- 2. Contemporary Approaches
- 2.1. Introduction
- 2.2. Transparency versus Alienation: Moran
- 2.3. Transparency as Inference from World to Mind: Byrne
- 2.4. Transparency as Inference from Judgment to Belief: Peacocke
- 2.5. Transparency and Expression: Finkelstein and Bar-On
- 2.6. Conclusion
- 3. The Reflectivist Approach
- 3.1. Reflectivism and Its Problems
- 3.2. Sartre and Reflectivism
- 3.3. Nonpositional Consciousness and Transparency
- 3.4. The Structure of the Sartrean Account
- 3.5. Conclusion
- Part II: Self-Consciousness and the First-Person Perspective
- 4. Consciousness-as-Subject
- 4.1. Introduction
- 4.2. Imagining-as-Subject
- 4.3. Representing-as-Subject in General
- 4.4. Subjective versus Objective Attitudes: Some Contrasts
- 4.5. Consciousness-as-Subject and Self-Knowledge
- 4.6. Consciousness-as-Subject and Nonpositional Consciousness
- 5. Self-Consciousness
- 5.1. Introduction
- 5.2. The Anti-Egoist Challenge
- 5.3. Egocentric Thought: Monadic versus Relational
- 5.4. Consciousness-as-Subject versus Self-Consciousness
- 5.5. Introducing the First Person
- 5.6. The Reflectivist Approach to the First Person
- 5.7. The First Person and Others
- 5.8. Implications
- 5.8.1. Referentialism versus Anti-Referentialism
- 5.8.2. Essentialism versus Inessentialism
- 5.8.3. Egoism versus Anti-Egoism
- 6. Bodily Awareness
- 6.1. Introduction
- 6.2. The Subject-Object Problem
- 6.3. Sartre's Enigmatic Intervention
- 6.4. Positional versus Nonpositional Consciousness Again
- 6.5. Nonpositional Bodily Awareness
- 6.6. The Primacy of Nonpositional Bodily Awareness
- 6.7. Conclusion
- Part III: Reflection and Self-Understanding
- 7. Reflection and Rationality
- 7.1. Introduction
- 7.2. A Budget of Difficulties
- 7.3. Rationality and the Taking Condition
- 7.4. Taking and Reflection
- 7.5. Self-Reflection
- 7.6. Responses to Difficulties
- 7.7. Rational versus Nonrational Minds
- 8. Armchair Psychology
- 8.1. Introduction
- 8.2. Two Kinds of Armchair Psychology
- 8.3. First Illustration: Intentional Action
- 8.4. Second Illustration: Perception
- 8.5. Modes of Presentation and Implicit Understanding
- 8.6. The Nature of Reflection