http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
This edited volume brings together recent work on the nature of belief, imagination, and delusion, and seeks to get clearer on the nature of belief and imagination, the ways in which they relate to one another, and how they might be integrated into accounts of delusional belief formation.
Cover -- Belief, Imagination, and Delusion -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Contributors -- 1: Introduction -- 1. Overview of the Main Themes and Questions -- 1.1 What Can Delusion Teach Us about the Nature of Belief and Imagination? -- 1.2 What Roles Do Belief and Imagination Play in Certain Other Mental Phenomena? -- 1.3 What Is the Nature of Delusional Experience? -- 1.4 What Is the Relationship between Delusions, Irrationality, and Doxasticism? -- 2. Concluding Remarks -- 3. Synopses of Chapters -- 3.1 Chapter 2. Kengo Miyazono: 'Delusion and Self-Knowledge' -- 3.2 Chapter 3. Amy Kind: 'Contrast or Continuum? The Case of Belief and Imagination' -- 3.3 Chapter 4. Philip R. Corlett: 'Imagination, Agency, and Predictive Processing' -- 3.4 Chapter 5. Anna Ichino: 'Religious Imaginings' -- 3.5 Chapter 6. Michael Omoge: 'On the Place of Imagination in the Architecture of the Mind' -- 3.6 Chapter 7. Neil Levy: 'Believing in Stories: Delusions, Superstitions, Conspiracy Theories, and Other Fairy Tales' -- 3.7 Chapter 8. Garry Young: 'The Capgras Delusion: An Interactionist Approach Revisited' -- 3.8 Chapter 9. Philip Gerrans: 'Cotard Syndrome: The Experience of Inexistence' -- 3.9 Chapter 10. Douglas Lavin and Lucy O'Brien: 'Delusions and Everyday Life' -- 3.10 Chapter 11. Sophie Archer: 'Why Do You Believe That? Delusion and Epistemic Reasons' -- 3.11 Chapter 12. Nicholas Furl, Max Coltheart, and Ryan McKay: 'The Paradox of Delusions: Are Deluded Individuals Resistant to Evidence?' -- 3.12 Chapter 13. Paul Noordhof: 'Irrationality and the Failures of Consciousness' -- Acknowledgements -- References -- PART I: LESSONS FROM DELUSION ON BELIEF AND IMAGINATION -- 2: Delusion and Self-Knowledge -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Doxastic Recognition -- 3. Non-Doxastic Function -- 4. Tracking Function Rejected -- 5. Self-Interpretation Theory Rejected.
6. Tracking Phenomenology -- 6.1 Basic Ideas -- 6.2 Clarifications -- 6.3 Objections -- 7. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 3: Contrast or Continuum?: The Case of Belief and Imagination -- 1. Understanding the Orthodoxy -- 2. Clarifying the Challenge -- 3. Two Arguments -- 3.1 The Argument from Seamless Transition -- 3.2 The Argument from Functional Profiles -- 4. The Way Forward -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 4: Imagination, Agency, and Predictive Processing -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Algorithms for Learning and Belief -- 3. Prediction Errors -- 4. Associative Learning -- 5. Imagination -- 6. Imagination and Psychosis -- 7. Reinforcement Learning and Imagination -- 8. Source Monitoring -- 9. Simple Mechanisms, Complex Phenomena -- 10. The Reality of Perception -- References -- PART II: BELIEF AND IMAGINATION IN THE WILD -- 5: Religious Imaginings -- 1. Religious Attitudes, Beliefs, and Imaginings -- 1.1 Imagination and Belief -- 2. 'Appeals to Evidence' vs. 'Sensitivity to Evidence' -- 2.1 Normative Excursus-Job vs. Thomas -- 3. Religious Contradictions -- 4. Religious Avowals Unmasked -- 5. Religious Imaginings and Religious "Credences" -- 5.1 Imagination and Belief-Again -- 6. Two Forms of Religious Imaginings-and Their Place in Religious Faith -- 6.1 Religious Imaginings and Religious Faith -- 7. Conclusion -- Acknowledgements -- References -- 6: On the Place of Imagination in the Architecture of the Mind -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Cognitive Support -- 3. Cognitive Dissent -- 4. Against Cognitive Dissent -- 4.1 Basicality: Towards Double Dissociation between Perception and Language -- 4.2 Aphantasia: Towards Single Dissociation between Experiential and Propositional Imagination -- 5. In Defence of Cognitive Support -- 6. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- References.
7: Believing in Stories: Delusions, Superstitions, Conspiracy Theories, and Other Fairy Tales -- 1. Superstition Without Belief -- 2. Hijacking the Narrative Machinery -- 3. Acquiescence in Fictions -- 4. Objections and Conclusions -- Acknowledgements -- References -- PART III: DELUSIONAL EXPERIENCE -- 8: The Capgras Delusion: An Interactionist Approach Revisited -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Traditional Role of Personal Experience -- 3. A Disruption Within the Facial Recognition System -- 4. Abnormal Data O -- 5. The Candidate Hypothesis Appearing as an Unbidden Thought -- 6. 'Anomalousness' as a Feeling of Unfamiliarity -- 7. The Need for a Less Reductionist Approach to Hypothesis Selection -- 8. Psychological Inevitability? -- 9. Delusional Atmosphere -- 10. Experiential Transformation -- 11. Perceiving an Impostor -- 12. The Second Factor -- 13. Conclusion -- References -- 9: Cotard Syndrome: The Experience of Inexistence -- 1. The Cotard Syndrome -- 2. Depersonalization Experience as the FirstFactor in Cotard Delusion -- 3. Interoceptive Active Inference and Self-Awareness -- 4. Depersonalization Experience and the Insula -- 5. Two Objections to Deaffectualization Accounts of DPD and Cotard Delusion -- 6. Disintegration of the Self-Model -- 7. Factors in Delusion Formation -- References -- 10: Delusions and Everyday Life -- 1. The Psychological Attitude Approach -- 2. Expressions of Delusions -- 3. Expressions of Everyday Delusional Thinking -- 4. What Are Delusions About? -- 5. Delusions in Relation to Framework or 'Hinge' Judgements -- References -- PART IV: DELUSIONS, BELIEF, AND EVIDENCE -- 11: Why Do You Believe That?: Delusion and Epistemic Reasons -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Narrowing the Focus -- 3. Fidelity and Lamp-Posts -- 4. Believing on the Basis of No Subjective Epistemic Reason -- 5. The Anscombean Condition -- 6. Conclusion.
Acknowledgements -- References -- 12: The Paradox of Delusions: Are Deluded Individuals Resistant to Evidence? -- 1. Integration of Evidence and Prior Belief: Computational Approaches -- 2. Deluded Individuals Form Inflexible Beliefs: The Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence -- 3. Are Deluded Individuals Better at Using Prior Belief to Perceive Ambiguous Stimuli? -- 4. Can a Strong Prior Explain both Delusions and Hallucinations? -- 5. Deluded Individuals Are Overly Responsive to Evidence: The Beads Task -- 6. Deluded Individuals Are Overly Responsive to Evidence: Other Empirical Examples -- 7. Deluded Individuals Are Overly Responsive to Evidence: Corollary Discharge Theory -- 8. Deluded Individuals Are Overly Responsive to Evidence: Aberrant Salience and Dopaminergic Prediction Error -- 9. Two-Factor Theory and Responsiveness to Evidence -- 10. Future Directions -- References -- 13: Irrationality and the Failures of Consciousness -- 1. Theoretical Irrationalities -- 2. The Two-Faced Character of Belief and Two Distinctive Features of One Face -- 3. Three Failed Explanations of Transparency and the Uncontrollability Thesis -- 3.1 Agent-Teleological Theories -- 3.2 Normative Approaches -- 3.3 Biological-Teleological Theories -- 4. Action, Full Consciousness, and the Uncontrollability Thesis -- 5. Consequences for Delusion and Self-Deception -- References -- Index.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge