http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Feeling Like It investigates the relationship between being inclined to do something and being moved to do it. Schapiro defends a Kant-inspired ""inner-animal"" view, and argues that provides a better view of inclination and will than some familar theories.
1 Framing the question -- 1.1 The moment of drama -- 1.2 Why focus on the moment of drama? -- 1.3 Inclination, emotion, and desire -- 1.4 Philosophical method -- 1.5 The concept of inclination -- 1.6 A look ahead -- 2 The Brute Force View -- 2.1 Augustine's metaphors -- 2.2 The Brute Force View as a ghost -- 2.3 Three conceptual constraints on a theory of inclination -- 2.4 A closer look at asymmetric pressure -- 2.5 A closer look at non-voluntariness -- 2.6 Conclusion -- 3 The Practical Thinking View -- 3.1 The Practical Thinking View -- 3.2 Motivational monism -- 3.3 Quinn's critique of functionalism -- 3.4 Scanlon's theory -- 3.5 Scanlon's account of non-voluntariness -- 3.6 The perceptual analogy -- 3.7 Conclusion -- 4 The Inner Animal View -- 4.1 Sketch of the Inner Animal View -- 4.2 Inspiration from Kant -- 4.3 Korsgaard on animal agency -- 4.4 Being necessitated and being affected -- 4.5 Initial worries: dualism and metaphor -- 4.6 Another worry: narrowly biological? -- 4.7 Satisfying an inclination -- 4.8 Conclusion -- 5 The high road -- 5.1 The Inner Animal View and Korgaard's Constitution Model -- 5.2 The Inner Animal View and non-voluntariness -- 5.3 The inner animal view and deliberative role -- 5.4 Conclusion -- 6 The low road -- 6.1 What makes weak-willed action weak? -- 6.2 Weakness, inclination, and self-love -- 6.3 How could inclination pressure the free will? -- 6.4 Dehumanizing yourself -- 6.5 Self-deception and rationalization -- 6.6 Social pressure -- 6.7 Conclusion.
Oxford : Oxford University Press USA - OSO,c2021