http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
We are deeply social creatures. Our core social needs--for meaningful social inclusion--are more important than our civil and political needs and our economic welfare needs, and we won't secure those other things if our core social needs go unmet. Our core social needs ground a human right against social deprivation as well as a human right to have the resources to sustain other people. Kimberley Brownlee defends this fundamental but largely neglected human right; having defined social deprivation as a persistent lack of minimally adequate access to decent human contact, she then discusses situations such as solitary confinement and incidental isolation. Fleshing out what it means to belong, Brownlee considers why loneliness and weak social connections are not just moral tragedies, but often injustices, and argues that we endure social contribution injustice when we are denied the means to sustain others. Our core social needs can clash with our interests in interactive and associative freedom, and when they do, social needs take priority. We have a duty to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to satisfy their social needs. As Brownlee asserts, we violate this duty if we classify some people as inescapably socially threatening, either through using reductive, essentialist language that reduces people to certain acts or traits--'criminal', 'rapist', 'paedophile', 'foreigner'--or in the ways we physically segregate such people and fail to help people to reintegrate after segregation.
Intro -- Halftitle page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1. Social Beings -- Introduction -- 1.1 Social Needs -- 1.2 Empirical Arguments -- 1.3 Phenomenological Arguments -- 1.4 Respect-Based Arguments -- 1.5 Social Needs versus Social Desires -- Conclusion -- 2. Social Deprivation -- Introduction -- 2.1 What Is Social Deprivation? -- 2.2 The Neglect of the Right against Social Deprivation -- 2.3 The Human Right against Social Deprivation -- 2.4 Arguments for the Human Right against Social Deprivation -- 2.5 Duty-Bearers -- 2.6 Objections
Conclusion -- 3. Sustaining Others -- Introduction -- 3.1 The Need to Sustain -- 3.2 Social Abilities -- 3.3 Social Opportunities -- 3.4 Social Connections -- 3.5 Indirect Victims -- 3.6 The Darker Side of Our Need to Sustain -- Conclusion -- 4. Interactional Freedom -- Introduction -- 4.1 The Nature of Interactional Freedom -- 4.2 The Value of Interactional Freedom -- Conclusion -- 5. Dilemmas of Sociability -- Introduction -- 5.1 The Value of Associational Freedom_ Exclusivity -- 5.2 What If Everyone Did That? -- 5.3 Three Negative Dilemmas -- 5.4 Three Positive Dilemmas -- 5.5 Social Attitudes
Conclusion -- 6. Associational Freedom -- Introduction -- 6.1 Moral Permissions -- 6.2 Morally Wrong Associations -- 6.3 Moral Claim-Rights -- Conclusion -- 7. Moral Messiness -- Introduction: Three Stories -- 7.1 Moral Messiness -- 7.2 Piggybackers versus Parasites -- 7.3 Why Moral Messiness Is a Problem -- 7.4 Possible Solutions -- Conclusion -- 8. Segregation -- Introduction -- 8.1 The Language We Use -- 8.2 The People We Incarcerate -- 8.3 The Harms of Segregation -- 8.4 Forfeited Rights and Infringed Rights -- 8.5 Objections -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Introduction -- Chapter 1 -- Chapter 2
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Being Sure of Each Other : An Essay on Social Rights and Freedoms
Oxford : Oxford University Press USA - OSO, ©2020