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Conditionality & coercion : electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe /

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In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates, and they threaten others wit...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Mares, Isabela (Author), Young, Lauren E. (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2019.
Edition:First edition.
Series:Oxford studies in democratization.
Subjects:
Elections > Corrupt practices > Europe, Eastern.
Hungary > Politics and government.
Romania > Politics and government.
Corruption électorale > Europe de l'Est.
Hongrie > Politique et gouvernement.
Roumanie > Politique et gouvernement.
Democracy.
Political Ideologies.
POLITICAL SCIENCE.
Campaigns & Elections.
Political Process.
History & Theory.
Elections > Corrupt practices
Politics and government
Eastern Europe
Hungary
Romania
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Introduction
  • Disaggregating clientelism: resource constraints and informational signals
  • Context and research design
  • Policy favors: building on the status quo
  • Policy coercion: social conflict and control
  • Economic coercion: conflict and forbearance
  • Vote buying: non-targeted and unmonitored
  • Conclusion
  • Appendix A: Qualitative interviews
  • Appendix B: Locality surveys
  • Appendix C: Survey experiments
  • Bibliography
  • Index.