The political foundations of judicial independence in dictatorship and democracy /
Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Oxford, United Kingdom :
Oxford University Press,
2019.
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| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
| Summary: | Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type. |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource ; illustrations, tables. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780192583642 0192583646 9780191880384 0191880388 9780192583659 0192583654 |