http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
essays in the philosophy of language and metaphysics
A.W. Moore presents eighteen of his philosophical essays, written since 1986, on representing how things are. He sketches out the nature, scope, and limits of representation through language, and pays particular attention to linguistic representation, states of knowledge, the character of what is represented, and objective facts or truths.
"These essays by A.W. Moore are all concerned with the business of representing how things are - its nature, its scope, and its limits. The essays in Part One deal with linguistic representation and discuss topics such as rules of representation and their nature, the sorites paradox, and the very distinction between sense and nonsense. Wittgenstein's work, both early and late, figures prominently. One thesis that surfaces at various points is that some things are beyond representation. The essays in Part Two deal with representation more generally and with the character of what is represented, and owe much to Bernard Williams's argument for the possibility of representation from no point of view. They touch more or less directly on the distinction between0representation from a point of view and representation from no point of view-in some cases by exploring various consequences of Kant's belief that representation of how things are physically is always, eo ipso, representation from a point of view. One thesis that surfaces at various points is that nothing is beyond representation. Each of the essays in Part Three, which draw inspiration from the early work of Wittgenstein, indicate how the resulting tension between Parts One and Two is to be resolved: namely, by construing the first part as a thesis about states of knowledge or understanding, and the second part as a thesis about facts or truths."--
Introduction; 1. Part I: Language; 2. Part II:The World and Our Representations of it; 3. Part III: Ineffability; PART I. Language; 1. How Significant is the Use/Mention Distinction?; Abstract; 1. The distinction introduced; 2. The impossibility of the distinction's both being clear-cut and having the significance that it is usually thought to have; 3. Repercussions
2. The Underdetermination/Indeterminacy Distinction and the Analytic/Synthetic DistinctionAbstract; 1. The two distinctions; 1.1 The underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction; 1.2 The analytic/synthetic distinction; 1.3 Options for what to say if accepting the former distinction entails accepting the latter; 2. Tension between Quine's two doctrines concerning these distinctions; 3. Incompatibility between Quine's two doctrines concerning these distinctions; Appendix; 3. What are these Familiar Words Doing Here?; Abstract; 1. Stating rules of representation
2. Representing things categorically3. Mentioning expressions; 4. Saying truly or falsely how things are; 5. Saying vaguely how things are; 6. Stating rules of rules of representation; 4. The Bounds of Nonsense; Abstract; Appendix; 5. Transcendental Idealism in Wittgenstein, and Theories of Meaning; Abstract; 1. Transcendental idealism and the predicament that is inherent in it; 2. Wittgenstein's later work and its preclusion of a philosophically substantial theory of meaning; 3. The idea that meaning is a matter of how we carry on
4. How a philosophically substantial theory of meaning would expose the predicament inherent in Wittgenstein's transcendental idealismPostscript for the reprint; 6. The Bounds of Sense; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. The Tractatus; 3. Kant; 4. Logical positivism; 5. Quine; 6. Conclusion; PART II. The World and Our Representations of it; 7. A Note on Kant's First Antinomy; Abstract; 8. Bird on Kant's Mathematical Antinomies; Abstract; 9. Solipsism and Subjectivity; Abstract; 1. Solipsism and its formulation; 2. The Putnam objection to (S); 3. The natural counter-objection; 4. The Putnam reply
5. The reinforced counter-objection6. Whither solipsism?; 10. One or Two Dogmas of Objectivism; Abstract; 1. Introduction; 2. Six things that may happen when we reŁect critically on our beliefs; 3. Nagel's fundamental idea and two difficulties that he faces; 4. One way in which Nagel might try to face the first difficulty; 5. A second way in which Nagel might try to face the first difficulty; 6. A third way in which Nagel might try to face the first difficulty, and his way of facing the second; 11. Apperception and the Unreality of Tense; Abstract
Includes bibliographical references (pages 261-274) and index.
Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2019