http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
This edited volume advances the new subdiscipline of metaepistemology by drawing on the sophisticated frameworks that have been developed in metaethics concerning practical normativity. Chapters examine whether these theories can be applied to epistemic normativity and consider what this may tell us about both epistemic and practical normaitivity.
Introduction -- The costs of epistemic realism -- Defending the moral/epistemic parity -- Passing the epistemic buck -- Is epistemology autonomous? -- Logical disagreement -- Moral and epistemic error theory -- Doubts about "genuinely normative" epistemic reasons -- How tot hbe an epistemic expressivist -- Thick epistemic concepts -- Epistemic planning, epistemic internalism, and luminosity -- Believing well.
edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting.
Includes bibliographical references and index.