Regard for reason in the moral mind /
The burgeoning science of ethics has fostered pessimism about moral thought and action: we're told that they are driven by arbitrary factors and unreasoned feelings. Joshua May argues compellingly that this pessimism is not justified: moral judgment and motivation are fundamentally rational ent...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Oxford, United Kingdom :
Oxford University Press,
2018.
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| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
Table of Contents:
- Cover; Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; List of Tables and Figures; Introduction; 1: Empirical Pessimism; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Pessimism about Moral Cognition; 1.2.1 Sources of pessimism; 1.2.2 Reason vs. emotion?; 1.2.3 Rationalism vs. sentimentalism; 1.3 Pessimism about Moral Motivation; 1.3.1 Sources of pessimism; 1.3.2 Non-cognitivism & relativism; 1.4 Optimistic Rationalism; 1.4.1 From moral judgment to knowledge; 1.4.2 From moral motivation to virtue; 1.4.3 Moral enhancement; 1.5 Coda: Appealing to Science.
- PART I: Moral Judgment & Knowledge2: The Limits of Emotion; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Moralizing with Feelings?; 2.2.1 Moralizing conventions; 2.2.2 Amplifying with incidental emotions; 2.3 Accounting for Slight Amplification; 2.3.1 Emotions as effects of moral judgments; BEHAVIORAL DATA: MORALIZATION; NEUROSCIENTIFIC DATA: ERP; 2.3.2 Misattribution of arousal; 2.4 Psychopathology; 2.4.1 Psychopathy; MORAL COMPETENCE; RATIONAL DEFICITS; ABNORMAL DEVELOPMENT; IN SUM; 2.4.2 Lesion studies; 2.5 Conclusion; 3: Reasoning beyond Consequences; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Consequences; 3.3 Beyond Consequences.
- 3.3.1 Intentional vs. accidental outcomes3.3.2 Actions vs. omissions; 3.3.3 Personal harm: force, contact, and battery; 3.3.4 Means vs. byproduct; 3.3.5 Unifying with agential involvement; 3.4 Moral Inference; 3.4.1 Moral reasoning, fast and slow?; 3.4.2 Post-hoc rationalization?; 3.4.3 Universal moral grammar?; 3.5 Conclusion; 4: Defending Moral Judgment; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Empirical Debunking in Ethics; 4.3 The Debunker's Dilemma; 4.4 Emotions; 4.5 Framing Effects; 4.6 Evolutionary Pressures; 4.7 Automatic Emotional Heuristics; 4.8 Explaining the Dilemma; 4.9 Conclusion.
- 5: The Difficulty of Moral Knowledge5.1 Introduction; 5.2 The Threat of Selective Debunking; 5.2.1 Process debunking; 5.2.2 Consistency reasoning; 5.3 The Threat of Peer Disagreement; 5.3.1 Which disagreements?; 5.3.2 Moral foundations; 5.3.3 Epistemic peers; 5.4 Conclusion; PART II: Moral Motivation & Virtue; 6: Beyond Self-Interest; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 The Egoism-Altruism Debate; 6.3 Empirical Evidence for Altruism; 6.3.1 Early empirical debates; 6.3.2 Developmental evidence; 6.3.3 Empathy-induced altruism; 6.4 Self-Other Merging; 6.4.1 Merging as no-self?
- 6.4.2 Merging as non-altruistic?6.5 Dividing Self from Other; 6.5.1 Peculiar beliefs; 6.5.2 Indeterminate identities; 6.5.3 Sharing properties; 6.5.4 Separating self and other; 6.6 Conclusion; 7: The Motivational Power of Moral Beliefs; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Ante Hoc Rationalization; 7.2.1 Temptation by appeal; 7.2.2 Rationalizing imprudence; 7.3 Rationalizing Immorality; 7.3.1 Motivated moral reasoning; 7.3.2 Moral licensing; 7.3.3 Moral hypocrisy; 7.4 Motivating Virtue; 7.4.1 Moral integrity & willpower; 7.4.2 Many virtuous motives; 7.5 Conclusion; 8: Freeing Reason from Desire.