rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: To the best of our knowledge
    sub title: social expectations and epistemic normativity
  name:
    name part: Goldberg, Sanford
    name part: 1967-
    role:
      role term: creator
    role:
      role term: author.
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  genre: Electronic books.
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: enk
    date issued: 2018
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: remote
    extent: 1 online resource
  abstract: Sanford C. Goldberg argues in this volume that epistemic normativity - the sort of normativity implicated in assessments of whether a belief amounts to knowledge - is grounded in the things we properly expect of one another as epistemic subjects. In developing this claim Goldberg argues that epistemic norms and standards themselves are generated by the expectations that arise out of our profound and ineliminable dependence on one another for what we know of the world. The expectations in question are those through which we hold each other accountable to standards of both (epistemic) reliability and (epistemic) responsibility. In arguing for this Goldberg aims to honor the insights of both internalist and externalist approaches to epistemic justification. The resulting theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for the nature of epistemic assessment itself, as well as for our understanding of epistemic defeat, epistemic justification, epistemic responsibility, and the various social dimensions of knowledge.
  table of contents: Introduction : the aim of this project -- Epistemically proper belief : the very idea -- Epistemic assessment : core criteria and general expectations -- Core criteria I : permissions to rely on cognitive processes -- Core criteria II : coherence-infused reliabilism (CIR) -- General expectations I : entitlements to expect and social epistemic responsibility -- General expectations II : normative defeat and ultima facie espistemic propriety -- Epistemic repsonsibility in social context.
  note: Sanford C. Goldberg.
  note: Includes bibliographical references and index.
  subject:
    topic: Epistemics
  subject:
    topic: Knowledge, Theory of
  subject:
    topic: Philosophy of mind
  subject:
    topic: Épistémique
  subject:
    topic: Théorie de la connaissance
  subject:
    topic: Philosophie de l'esprit
  subject:
    topic: epistemology
  subject:
    topic: PHILOSOPHY
    topic: Epistemology
  subject:
    topic: Epistemics
  subject:
    topic: Knowledge, Theory of
  subject:
    topic: Philosophy of mind
  classification: B820.3
  classification: 121
  identifier: 9780192512345
  identifier: 019251234X
  identifier: 9780191853203
  identifier: 0191853208
  identifier: 9780198793670
  identifier: 0198793677
  identifier: http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login
  record info:
    record content source: N$T
    record creation date: 180315
    record change date: 20260319164724.1
    record identifier: in00005715634
    language of cataloging:
      language term: eng