Making things up /

We frequently speak of certain things or phenomena being built out of or based in others. Making Things Up concerns these relations, which connect more fundamental things to less fundamental things: Karen Bennett calls these 'building relations'. She aims to illuminate what it means to say...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bennett, Karen, 1971- (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : OUP Oxford, 2017.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Cover; Making Things Up; Copyright; Dedication; Acknowledgments; Contents; 1: Introduction; 2: Building I: Breaking Ground; 2.1 Some Building Relations; 2.2 Two Main Axes of Difference; 2.3 What Is a Unity Thesis?; 2.4 Monism(s) and Unity Theses; 2.5 Against Generalist Monism about Building Relations; 3: Building II: Characterizing the Class; 3.1 Methodology; 3.2 Directedness; 3.2.1 Replying to challenges; 3.2.2 A positive argument; 3.3 Necessitation; 3.3.1 Against indeterministic building; 3.3.2 Two kinds of building determinism; 3.3.3 Why another clause is needed; 3.4 Generativity.
  • 3.5 Ought More Be Added?3.6 Wrapping Up; 4: Causing; 4.1 Two Kinds of Causal Taint; 4.2 The First Kind of Causal Taint: Causation is a Building Relation; 4.2.1 Five analogies; 4.2.2 A methodological principle; 4.2.3 Objections to the claim that causation is a building relation; 4.3 The Second Kind of Causal Taint: Some Particular Building Relations Are Themselves Causal; 4.3.1 The first grade of causal involvement; 4.3.2 The second grade of causal involvement; 4.3.3 The third grade of causal involvement; 4.4 Back to Two Kinds of Causal Taint; 5: Absolute Fundamentality.
  • 5.1 Methodological Preliminaries5.2 Independence; 5.3 Completeness; 5.4 The Relation between Independence and Completeness; 5.5 Interlude: Is Building Well-Founded?; 5.6 In Defense of Independence over Completeness; 5.7 Naturalness; 5.8 The Relation between Independence and Naturalness; 5.9 In Defense of Independence over Naturalness; 5.10 Resisting Three Arguments against Defining It at All; 6: Relative Fundamentality; 6.1 Accounting for Relative Fundamentality; 6.2 Two Kinds of Primitivism about Relative Fundamentality; 6.2.1 Against extreme primitivism.
  • 6.2.2 A more sophisticated primitivism6.3 Characterizing Relative Fundamentality in Terms of Building; 6.4 Sketching and Rejecting a Toy Account; 6.4.1 The toy account; 6.4.2 Why Toy must be rejected; 6.5 The Messy Reality; 6.5.1 The strategy; 6.5.2 The multi-clause definition MFT; 6.6 Clarifying the Overall Picture; 6.6.1 Indexing and generalizing; 6.6.2 Causation revisited: exactly which relations generate relative fundamentality?; 6.6.3 A consequence: not everything stands in relative fundamentality relations; 6.6.4 The basic picture; 6.7 Other Matters Arising; 6.7.1 Comparatives.
  • 6.7.2 Formal features6.7.3 Objection: apparent counterexamples to clause (2); 6.7.4 Objection: have I changed the subject?; 6.8 Deflationism vs Sophisticated Primitivism; 7: Building Building?; 7.1 What is the Question, Exactly?; 7.2 Arguing for Anti-Primitivism; 7.3 Upwards Anti-Primitivism; 7.3.1 The view; 7.3.2 Trying to articulate its intuitiveness; 7.3.3 Regress averted; 7.4 The Opposition; 7.4.1 Two alternatives; 7.4.2 Can upwards anti-primitivism explain the grounding facts?; 7.4.3 Can upwards anti-primitivism explain patterns of grounding facts?; 7.4.4 Against the alternatives.