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Oxford studies in agency and responsibility
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility' is a series of volumes presenting outstanding new work on a set of connected themes, investigating such questions as: What does it mean to be an agent? What is the nature of moral responsibility? Of criminal responsibility? What is the relation between moral and criminal responsibility (if any)? What is the relation between responsibility and the metaphysical issues of determinism and free will? What do various psychological disorders tell us about agency and responsibility? How do moral agents develop? How does this developmental story bear on questions about the nature of moral judgment and responsibility? What do the results from neuroscience imply (if anything) for our questions about agency and responsibility? OSAR thus straddles the areas of moral philosophy and philosophy of action, but also draws from a diverse range of cross-disciplinary sources, including moral psychology, psychology proper (including experimental and developmental), philosophy of psychology, philosophy of law, legal theory, metaphysics, neuroscience, neuroethics, political philosophy, and more. It is unified by its focus on who we are as deliberators and (inter)actors, embodied practical agents negotiating (sometimes unsuccessfully) a world of moral and legal norms.
Cover; Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility: Volume 4; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgments; List of Contributors; Introduction; 1: Strong-willed Akrasia; 1.1 INTRODUCTION; 1.2 AKRASIA AND WEAKNESS OF WILL; 1.3 WEAKNESS OF WILL AS INTENTION-VIOLATION; 1.4 PROBLEMS WITH WEAKNESS OF WILL AS INTENTION-VIOLATION; 1.4.1 The "Irreducibly Normative" Aspect of Weakness of Will; 1.4.2 The Importance of Pain and Pleasure; 1.4.3 Character and the (Un)importance of Fulfilled Intentions; 1.5 STRONG-WILLED AKRASIA; References; 2: Practical Necessity and Moral Heroism; INTRODUCTION
2.1 MORAL HEROISM AND NON-OPTIONALITY2.1.1 Practical Necessity, Roughly; 2.1.2 Agency, Communion, and Responsibility; 2.1.3 Practical Necessity and Supererogation; 2.1.4 Perseverance and Personality; 2.2 PRACTICAL NECESSITY AND MORALPERSONALITY; 2.2.1 Persons and Situations, Character and Necessity; 2.2.2 Decision and Discovery: Practical Necessity, Deliberation, and Responsibility; 2.2.3 Real Necessity; 2.3 CONCLUSION: CULTIVATING HEROIC CHARACTER; References; 3: Intending, Settling, and Relying; 3.1 INTRODUCTION; 3.2 INTENDING AND SETTLING
3.3 FROM THE CONNECTION BETWEEN INTENDING AND SETTLING TO A CONSTRAINT ON INTENDING3.4 THE SETTLE CONDITION AND SHARED AGENCY; 3.5 RELIANCE AND BELIEF; 3.6 INTENTION, RELIANCE, AND THE SETTLE CONDITION; 3.7 INTENTION, RELIANCE, AND THE ANTICIPATION OF ONE'S FUTURE ACTION; 3.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS; References; 4: Entitlement to Reasons for Action; 4.1 ACTING ON A PRIOR INTENTION; 4.2 THE INTERPERSONAL CASE; 4.3 THE LIMITS OF ENTITLEMENT; CONCLUSION; References; 5: Free Will Pessimism; I. METAPHYSICAL ATTITUDES AND THE FREE WILL PROBLEM; II. COMPATIBILISM, SKEPTICISM, AND PESSIMISM
III. COMPATIBILISM AND "THE MORALITY SYSTEM"IV. INCOMPATIBILIST EVASIONS AND FREE WILL PESSIMISM; V. THE FREE WILL PROBLEM AND FREE WILL PESSIMISM; References; 6: Responsibility, Regret, and Protest; 6.1 DIFFERENT SENSES OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY; 6.2 A DESERT-FREE SENSE OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY; 6.3 BLAME AS MORAL PROTEST; 6.4 REGRET AND DESERVED GUILT; 6.5 BLAME AND OBLIGATION; 6.6 DEMANDS, WRONGNESS, AND PROTEST; 6.7 FINAL WORDS; References; 7: Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism about Culpability; 7.1 EPISTEMIC SKEPTICISM ABOUT CULPABILITY
7.2 THE EXPLANATORY QUALITY OF WILL ACCOUNT OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY7.3 THE EXPLANATORY QUALITY OF WILL ACCOUNT AND IGNORANT WRONGDOING; 7.4 SKEPTICAL WORRIES FROM EXPLANATORY INNOCENCE; References; 8: Causal Proportions and Moral Responsibility; 8.1 THE LOGICAL SPACE OF ANSWERS; 8.2 PROPORTIONALITY LUCK; 8.3 A CAUSAL AMBIGUITY IN DIFFERENCES OF CONTRIBUTION; 8.4 PROPORTIONALITY; 8.4.1 Causal Quantity; 8.4.2 Productive Theories of Causation; 8.4.3 Counterfactual Theories of Causation; 8.4.4 Omissions and Proportionality; 8.5 LESSONS; References; 9: The Path to Completion; 9.1 INTRODUCTION
Includes bibliographical references and index.
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