http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Christopher Peacocke examines the problem of knowing whether human beings can really know about the past, about what they are thinking, about what might be and whether freedom is really possible.
Preface -- Contents -- 1 The Integration Challenge -- 2 Truth, Content, and the Epistemic -- 2.1 The Linking Thesis -- 2.2 Consequences of the Argument for the Linking Thesis -- 2.3 The Linking Thesis and the Integration Challenge -- 2.4 Three Indicators for Solutions -- 2.5 A Look Ahead: Two Styles of Solution -- Appendix. Factive Reasons and Taking a Representational State at Face Value -- 3 The Past -- 3.1 The Property-Identity Link and its Role in Understanding -- 3.2 Past-Tense Truth: Some Metaphysics
3.3 Externalist Elements in Understanding the Past Tense3.4 Memory and the Property-Identity Link -- 3.5 â€?The Explanation by Means of Identity Does Not Work Hereâ€?: When and How It Does -- 3.6 Realism, Metaphysics, and the Theory of Meaning -- 3.7 Final Observations on the Temporal Case -- 4 Necessity -- 4.1 Problems and Goals -- 4.2 Admissibility, the Principles of Possibility, and the Modal Extension Principle -- 4.3 Other Principles of Possibility and the Truth Conditions of Modal Statements -- 4.4 Modalism, Understanding, Reduction
4.5 The Epistemology of Metaphysical Necessity4.6 Against the Thinker-Dependence of Necessity -- 4.7 Neo-Wittgensteinian Challenges -- 4.8 Conclusion and Prospects -- Appendix A. Modal Logic and the Principle-Based Conception -- Appendix B. Relaxing the Assumptions -- 5 Self-Knowledge and Intentional Content -- 5.1 Conscious Attitudes, Self-Ascription, and the Occupation of Attention -- 5.2 First Steps towards a Solution: Rational Sensitivity without Inference -- 5.3 Between Internal Introspectionism and â€?No-Reasonsâ€? Accounts
5.4 Why do these Self-Ascriptions Amount to Knowledge?5.5 Conceptual Redeployment: Supporting the Claim -- 5.6 Three Consequences of Redeployment -- 6 Self-Knowledge and Illusions of Transcendence -- 6.1 Representational Independence -- 6.2 Delta Theories -- 6.3 Representational Independence Outside the First Person? -- 6.4 An Illusion and its Source -- 6.5 Self-Knowledge, Subjectlessness, and Reductionist Views -- 7 Freedom -- 7.1 The Classical Problem and the Integration Challenge -- 7.2 An Intuitive Characterization of Freedom
7.3 â€?Could Have Done Otherwiseâ€?: The Closeness Account7.4 A Puzzling Inference -- 7.5 The Closeness Conception Elaborated -- 7.6 Non-Theoretical Construals of Freedom -- 7.7 Libertarianism -- 7.8 The Epistemology of Freedom -- 7.9 Neither Too Much nor Too Little? -- 8 Concluding Remarks -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL
digitized 2020. HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL
Includes bibliographical references and index.