Charitable giving and tax policy : a historical and comparative perspective /

A comparative and historical analysis of tax policies towards charitable giving in different countries that considers whether public policies actually boost private philanthropy.

Bibliographic Details
Other Authors: Fack, Gabrielle (Editor), Landais, Camille (Editor)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2016]
Edition:First edition.
Series:Studies of policy reform.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Cover; Charitable Giving and Tax Policy: A Historical and Comparative Perspective; Copyright; Acknowledgments; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Contributors; 1: Introduction; 1.1 A Rich History of Tax Policies; 1.1.1 United States; 1.1.2 Canada; 1.1.3 France; 1.1.4 Denmark; 1.2 What Can We Learn from Tax Data?; 1.3 Behavioral Responses to Tax Policies; 1.3.1 Price Elasticities; 1.3.2 Matching vs Rebate; 1.3.3 Tax Cheating; 1.4 Welfare and Policy Implications; 1.5 Organization of the Volume; 1.6 Glossary; References; 2: Charitable Giving and Economics; 2.1 Introduction
  • 2.2 The Motives for Giving2.3 Lifetime Giving and Charitable Bequests; 2.4 The Welfare Economics of Giving; 2.5 Conclusions; References; 3: Charitable Giving and Tax Policy in the US; 3.1 American Exceptionalism, the Social Contract, and Charitable Giving; 3.2 The Basics of the US Income Tax Policy; 3.3 The Outsized Role of the Rich; 3.4 Ongoing Issues in US Tax Policy and Charitable Giving; 3.5 Conclusion; Acknowledgments; References; 4: Philanthropy, Tax Policy, and Tax Cheating: A Long-Run Perspective on US data; 4.1 Introduction
  • 4.2 The Long-run of Charitable Contributions by the Very Wealthy4.2.1 Elasticity of Reported Contributions: Long-term Perspective; DATA & STRATEGY; RESULTS; 4.3 Charitable Giving Policy in the Presence of Tax Cheating; 4.3.1 A Model of Optimal Subsidy in the Presence of Tax Cheating; A SIMPLE CASE: UNIT ELASTICITY RULE WITH AND WITHOUT TAX CHEATING; A MODEL OF OPTIMAL SUBSIDY WITH TAXCHEATING; 4.3.2 A Natural Experiment on Tax Enforcement; UNITED STATES, 1969: TIGHTENING OF THE RULES REGULATING PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS; DATA AND STRATEGY; RESULTS; CALIBRATION; Conclusion
  • Appendix 4.A: Long-term series on contributions and effective marginal tax rates by income groupContributions; Effective Marginal Tax Rates; References; 5: Charitable Donations and Tax Relief in the UK; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Tax Relief on Giving; 5.2.1 Gift Aid; 5.2.2 Payroll Giving; 5.2.3 Gifts of Shares and Property; 5.2.4 Inheritance Tax; 5.3 Framework for Considering the Effects of Match and Rebate; 5.4 Survey Evidence on Match and Rebate; 5.5 Results; 5.6 Heterogeneity of Responses across Donors; 5.6.1 Reclaimers versus Non-reclaimers; 5.6.2 Level of Understanding
  • 5.6.3 Size of Contributions5.6.4 Adjusters/Non-adjusters; 5.7 Conclusions and Policy Implications; Acknowledgments; Appendix 5.A1: Presentation of the Scenarios; Initial donation; Introduction to scenarios; Example; References; Name Index; Subject Index.