http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Nicholas F. Stang explores Kant's theory of possibility, from the precritical period of the 1750-60s to the critical system initiated by the 'Critique of Pure Reason' in 1781. He argues that the key to understanding the relationship between these periods lies in Kant's reorientation of an ontological question towards a transcendental approach.
Cover; Kant's Modal Metaphysics; Copyright; Preface; The Unicorn and the Narwhal; Contents; Acknowledgments; List of Figures; List of Tables; Notes on the Text; Introduction; 1. From Ontology to Transcendental Philosophy; 2. Breakdown of Chapters; PART I: Kant's Pre-Critical Modal Metaphysics; 1: Logicism and Ontotheism; 1.1. Introduction; 1.2. Logicist Metaphysics; 1.3. Logicist Epistemology; 1.4. Ontotheism; 1.5. Possibilism; 1.6. Real Predicates; 2: Is Existence a Real Predicate?; 2.1. Introduction; 2.2. Descartes' Ontological Argument; 2.3. Leibniz's Ontological Argument.
2.4. Baumgarten's Ontological Argument2.5. The Argument in Beweisgrund: Leibniz; 2.6. The Argument in Beweisgrund: Baumgarten; 2.7. The Argument in the Critique of Pure Reason; 2.8. Absolute Positing; 3: Real Conflict, Real Grounds, Real Possibility; 3.1. Introduction; 3.2. Logical Grounds; 3.3. Real Grounds; 3.4. Real Conflict; 3.5. The Argument for Real Incompatibility; 3.6. Real Possibility; 4: Grounding Possibility; 4.1. Introduction; 4.2. Two Requirements on Possibility; 4.3. Harmony, Power, and Intellect; 4.4. "This thought rises far higher than a created being can reach."
4.5. Possibility, Thought, and Content5: Kant's Modal Argument; 5.1. Introduction; 5.2. Absolute Necessity; 5.3. The Only Possible Ground of Proof; 5.4. Prior Replies to the Plurality Objection; 5.5. E Pluribus Unum; 5.6. How (Not) to Represent God; 5.7. Kant's Pre-Critical Modal Metaphysics; PART II: Kant's Critical Modal Metaphysics; 6: Real Possibility and the Critical Turn; 6.1. Introduction; 6.2. Modal Epistemology in the Prize Essay; 6.3. Modal Epistemology in the Inaugural Dissertation; 6.4. Relation to an Object; 6.5. Intuition, Existence, and Possibility.
6.6. Transcendental Philosophy and the Concept of an Object6.7. A priori Cognition of Phenomena; 6.8. No a priori Cognition of Noumena; 7: Three Kinds of Real Possibility; 7.1. Introduction; 7.2. Critical Real Possibility; 7.3. Formal Possibility; 7.4. Empirical-Causal Possibility; 7.5. Noumenal-Causal Possibility; 8: Nomic Necessity; 8.1. Introduction; 8.2. What Nomic Necessity Is Not; 8.3. Essences: Real and Logical; 8.4. Essences, Natures, and Laws; 8.5. Essentialism and Constructivism in Metaphysical Foundations; 8.6. From Forms to Essences; 8.7. Nomic Possibility as Real Possibility.
8.8. Back to the Beginning9: The Unity of Kant's Modal Metaphysics; 9.1. Introduction; 9.2. Categories and Real Definitions; 9.3. Unschematized Modal Categories; 9.4. Absolutely Necessary Existence; 9.5. Postulates of Pure Theoretical Reason; 9.6. The Necessary Ends of Theoretical Reason; 10: The Antinomy of Kant's Modal Metaphysics; 10.1. Introduction; 10.2. Intuitive Intellect, Intellectual Intuition; 10.3. Some (Unsuccessful) Attempts to Resolve the Antinomy; 10.4. Resolving the Antinomy; 10.5. Noumenal Freedom without Noumenal Modality; 10.6. Representing Noumenal Modality.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2016