http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon addresses these key questions by focusing on an underlying issue - the nature of action explanation. He proposes a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behaviour is teleological rather than causal.
Cover; Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; 1: What's at Stake in the Free Will Debate?; 1.1 Criticism and Punishment; 1.1.1 Deterrence theories; 1.1.2 Quarantine model; 1.2 Praise and Reward; 1.3 Reactive Attitudes; 1.3.1 Negative attitudes: indignation and resentment; 1.3.2 Positive attitudes: gratitude; 1.3.3 Self-directed attitudes: pride and shame; 1.4 Free Will vs. Moral Responsibility; PART I: The Teleological Account of Action; 2: Teleology and Interpretation.
2.1 Reason Explanation as Irreducibly Teleological2.2 Rationalizability and Interpretation; 2.3 Some Illustrative Examples; 2.4 Multiple Goals; 2.5 Omissions; 2.6 Degrees of Goal-direction; 3: Rationalizability and Irrationality; 3.1 Emotions and Agency; 3.2 Irrational Actions; 3.3 Irrational Agents; 3.3.1 Lottery tickets; 3.3.2 The endowment effect; 4: Other Objections to the Teleological Account; 4.1 Mele's Objection: Norm and the Martians; 4.2 First Person Perspective and Transparency; 4.3 The Truthmaker Worry; 4.4 Simplicity and Mystery; 5: Rationalizing Principles and Causal Explanation.
5.1 The Systematic and Unavoidable Use of Rationalizing Principles5.2 The Need for a Causalist Explanation; 5.3 Possible Causalist Explanations; 5.3.1 Empirical success; 5.3.2 Functionalist analysis of mental states; 5.3.3 Selectional explanation; 6: Deviant Causal Chains; 6.1 The Nature of the Problem; 6.2 A Suggested Solution from Mele; 6.3 Schlosser and Causation by Content; 6.4 Aguilar and Reliability; 6.4.1 The first approach: differential explanation; 6.4.2 The second approach: reliability as probability of satisfying the goal; 6.5 Conclusion.
7: The Commitments of Common-Sense Psychology7.1 The Basic Argument; 7.2 First Premise: Nature of the Causal Theory of Action; 7.3 The Second Premise: Causation and Reification; 7.3.1 A simple dispositionalist denial of (P2); 7.3.2 A functionalist denial of (P2); 7.3.3 Adding token identity to dispositional or functionalist views; 7.3.4 Dualist or emergentist views; 7.4 The Third Premise: Reification and Existence; 7.5 The Argument Revised; PART II: The Teleological Account of Free Will and Responsibility; 8: Application to Free Will: Non-Causal Compatibilism; 8.1 The Basic Proposal.
8.2 Determinism and Freedom8.3 Degrees of Freedom; 8.3.1 Cases in the gray area; 8.3.2 Spectrum of agential capacity; 8.3.3 Responsibility vs. blameworthiness; 8.3.4 Degrees vs. indeterminacy or vagueness; 8.4 The Philosophers' Distinctions; 9: Irrational Actions and Freedom; 9.1 Stupid Behavior; 9.2 Immoral Actions; 9.3 Weakness of Will; 9.3.1 Whether weakness of will exists; 9.3.2 Are weak-willed actions free?; 9.3.3 Willing vs. unwilling addict; 9.3.4 Perverse behaviors; 9.4 Conclusion; 10: Extraordinary Cases; 10.1 Frankfurt Cases; 10.2 Psychopaths; 10.3 Coercion; 10.4 Brainwashing.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2016