http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
activist shareholders, decoupled risk, and corporate governance
New investment techniques and new types of shareholder activists are shaking up the traditional ways of equity investment that inform current corporate law and governance. This book evaluates different risk-decoupling strategies and makes the case for regulatory intervention, developing a comprehensive proposal to address the regulatory problem.
Cover; The Deconstruction of Equity; Copyright; Table of Contents; Preface; Table of Cases; Table of Legislation; I. Introduction; A. Context; B. Structure; II. Shareholders in Corporate Governance; A. Costs of Voting and Apathy; B. Blockholders; C. Activist Shareholders and Hedge Funds; D. The Financial Crisis and Recent Developments; E. Shareholders and Risk-​decoupling; F. Conclusion; III. Risk-​Decoupling Strategies; A. Negative versus Positive Risk-​decoupling; B. Negative Risk-​decoupling: More Influence than Risk; 1. Category 1: Financial derivatives; 2. Category 2: Share lending
3. Category 3: Record-​date captureC. Positive Risk-​decoupling: More Risk than Influence; 1. Contracts for Difference; 2. CfD investments and their abuse; 3. Case studies; 4. Conclusion; D. Empirical Evidence; E. Related Situations Not Covered in This Book; 1. Related risk-​decoupling strategies; 2. 'One share, one vote'; 3. Proxy advisors; 4. Limited liability; F. Summary; IV. The Failure of Traditional Categories of Law; A. Corporate and Securities Law; B. Hedge Fund Regulation; V. Problem Perspectives; A. Outline and Relevance of the Problem; B. Principal-​agent Perspective
1. Risk- decoupling and agency costs2. Possible reduction of agency costs?; 3. Objection; 4. Implications; C. Information Costs; 1. Information and transaction cost theory; 2. Risk- decoupling and information costs; 3. Summary and implications; D. Corporate Finance; 1. Debt versus equity; 2. Risk- decoupling between debt and equity; 3. Shareholders as residual risk- bearers; 4. Implications; E. The Market for Corporate Control; 1. Harmful market impacts of CfD dealings; 2. What is wrong with a general CfD disclosure obligation?; 3. CfDs and the market for corporate control; VI. Solutions
A. Doing Nothing1. Persisting decoupling of voting rights; 2. Self- regulation; 3. Self- regulation of the hedge fund industry; 4. Self- help in securities lending cases; 5. Risk-​decoupling in existing legal frameworks; 6. Conclusion; B. Ban and Restriction; 1. Ban on decoupling; 2. Difficulties with the record-​date problem; 3. Conclusion; C. Transparency; 1. Transparency as a response to decoupling problems; 2. Legislative activity and reactions; 3. Costs and critique; 4. Key issues of a transparency regime; 5. Co-​ordination with transparency of short selling
6. A concrete proposal: An integrated disclosure system7. Summary; D. Disenfranchisement; 1. A general prohibition to vote?; 2. Case-​by-​case regulator's decision; 3. Limitations of the approach; 4. Summary; E. Fiduciary Duties; 1. Fiduciary duties as an established legal instrument; 2. Individual disadvantages; 3. Conclusion; F. Results, Overview, and Assessment; G. Positive Risk-​Decoupling-​An Alternative Regulatory Model Targeting CfD Abuse; 1. Proposed regulatory structure; 2. Reply to criticism; 3. Efficiency of enforcement; 4. Conclusion; VII. The Federal Dimension; A. Admissibility
Includes bibliographical references (pages 235-263) and index.
Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2016