http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
new essays on action, belief, and assertion
Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in many current debates in epistemology and beyond. Paramount among these are debates about belief, action, and assertion. Three primary questions organize the literature. What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate assertion? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate action? With the tremendous but disparate growth of the literature on epistemic norms, the_x000D_ time is ripe for a volume bringing together papers by established and emerging figures, with an eye toward the interconnections among our three questions. That is precisely what this volume seeks to do.
Intellectual flourishing as the fundamental epistemic norm / Berit Brogaard -- Lenient accounts of warranted assertability / E.J. Coffman -- Having false reasons / Juan Comesaña and Matthew McGrath -- On knowing one's reason / Jonathan Dancy -- Knowledge versus truth / John Gibbons -- Epistemic normativity / Jonathan L. Kvanvig -- The unity of reason / Clayton Littlejohn -- Epistemic luck, safety, and assertion / Duncan Pritchard -- Epistemic agency and judgment / Ernest Sosa -- You gotta believe / John Turri -- The spectra of epistemic norms / Matt Weiner -- Reasons for belief, reasons for action, the aim of belief, and the aim of action / Daniel Whiting -- The dual-aspect norms of belief and assertion : a virtue approach to epistemic norms / Sarah Wright.
edited by Clayton Littlejohn and John Turri.
Includes bibliographical references and index.