http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Michael Ridge presents an original expressivist theory of normative judgments which offers distinctive treatments of key problems in metaethics, semantics, and practical reasoning. He argues that normative judgments are hybrid states partly constituted by ordinary beliefs and partly constituted by desire-like states.
Cover -- Impassioned Belief -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: Locating Normative Thought and Discourse -- Chapter 2: Normative Thought and Discourse: Affective, Action-Guiding, and Acrimonious -- Chapter 3: Ecumenical Cognitivism -- Chapter 4: Introducing Ecumenical Expressivism -- Chapter 5: Compositionality, Inference, and the Frege-Geach Problem -- Chapter 6: Disagreement -- Chapter 7: Truth -- Chapter 8: Rationality -- 1: Locating Normative Thought and Discourse
1. Practically Normative Thought and Discourse: A Functional Gloss2. Evaluatives -- 3. Directives -- 4. Reasons -- 5. Locating the Normative -- Conclusion -- 2: Normative Thought and Discourse: Affective, Action-Guiding, and Acrimonious -- 1. Normative Judgment: Action-Guiding -- 2. Normative Judgment: Affective -- 3. Normative Judgment: Acrimonious -- Conclusion -- 3: Ecumenical Cognitivism -- 1. The Many Ecumenical Cognitivisms -- 2. Implicative Ecumenical Cognitivism -- 3. Judgment-Individuating Ecumenical Cognitivism -- Conclusion
4: Introducing Ecumenical Expressivism1. The Expressivist Gambit -- 2. Pragmatics, Semantics, and Meta-Semantics -- 3. Ideationalism and Normative Propositions -- 4. Normative Perspectives: The Power of Negative Thinking -- 5. Normative Judgment -- 6. Normative Propositions -- 7. Advantages of Ecumenical Expressivism -- Conclusion -- 5: Compositionality, Inference, and the Frege-Geach Problem -- 1. What is the Frege-Geach Problem? -- 2. Unasserted Contexts and Compositionality: Non-Ecumenical Expressivism
3. Solving the Frege-Geach Problem: Offloading Logical Complexity4. Logical Validity: A First Pass -- 5. Logical Validity: Formality Regained -- 6. Intensional Contexts and Implicatures -- 7. Wishful Thinking -- Conclusion -- 6: Disagreement -- 1. Disagreement in Attitude -- 1.1 Mere difference without disagreement -- 1.2 Non-linguistic agents -- 1.3 Why privilege belief and desire? -- 1.4 Agent-relativity -- 2. Disagreement in Plan -- 2.1 Difference versus disagreement -- 2.2 Circularity -- 2.3 From practice to theory: a gap in the argument?
2.4 Impasse3. Disagreement in Prescription -- 4. Ecumenical Expressivism and Disagreement in Prescription -- Conclusion -- 7: Truth -- 1. Ecumenical Expressivism, Truth-Aptness, and Subjectivism -- 2. The Deflationist Gambit -- 3. The Truth in Ecumenical Expressivism -- 4. Advantages of this Approach -- 5. The Explosion of the Normative? -- 6. What if Soames is Wrong? -- Conclusion -- 8: Rationality -- 1. Rational Capacities -- 2. Rationality as a Success Notion -- 3. Ecumenical Cognitivism Revisited -- 4. Discontinuities Revisited -- Conclusion
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Oxford, [England] : Oxford University Press, ©2014