http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Are there things we should value because they are, quite simply good? Richard Kraut argues that there are not. Goodness, he holds, is not a reason-giving property - in fact, there may be no such thing. It is an illusory and insidious category of practical thought.
Cover; Contents; Acknowledgments; 1. Moore and the Idea of Goodness; 2. Goodness before and after Moore; 3. An Argument for Absolute Goodness; 4. Absolute Evil, Relative Goodness; 5. Recent Skepticism about Goodness; 6. Being Good and Being Good for Someone; 7. Noninstrumental Advantageousness; 8. The Problem of Intelligibility; 9. The Problem of Double Value; 10. Pleasure Reconsidered; 11. Scanlon's Buck-Passing Account of Value; 12. Moore's Argument against Relative Goodness; 13. Goodness and Variability; 14. Impersonality: An Ethical Objection to Absolute Goodness.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
New York : Oxford University Press, ©2011