Against absolute goodness /

Are there things we should value because they are, quite simply good? Richard Kraut argues that there are not. Goodness, he holds, is not a reason-giving property - in fact, there may be no such thing. It is an illusory and insidious category of practical thought.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Kraut, Richard, 1944-
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York : Oxford University Press, ©2011.
Series:Oxford moral theory.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Description
Summary:Are there things we should value because they are, quite simply good? Richard Kraut argues that there are not. Goodness, he holds, is not a reason-giving property - in fact, there may be no such thing. It is an illusory and insidious category of practical thought.
Physical Description:1 online resource (xii, 224 pages)
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:9780199844470
019984447X
9780199919550
0199919550