http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Daniel Russell develops the idea that a necessary part of virtue is practical intelligence, the skill of determining what the right (e.g. kind or fair) thing to do would be on a given occasion, which requires much time, experience and practice. This idea has a key role to play in contemporary virtue ethics.
Cover -- Contents -- 1. Practical Intelligence and the Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach -- 1.1 Deliberation -- 1.2 Phronesis -- 1.3 The Phronesis Controversy -- Part I. Phronesis, Virtue, and Right Action -- 2. Right Action for Virtue Ethics -- 2.1 Right Action and Serious Practical Concerns -- 2.2 Two Constraints on Right Action -- 2.3 Must Virtue Ethics Accept the Act Constraint? -- 2.4 Can Virtue Ethics Accept the Act Constraint? -- 3. Right Action and Virtuous Motives -- 3.1 The Structure of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics -- 3.2 Virtuous Acts and Virtuous Motivations -- 3.3 Why Virtues are Virtues -- 3.4 Reasons for Virtue -- 4. Right Action and The Virtuous Person -- 4.1 Doing Without The Virtuous Person -- 4.2 Virtuous Enough -- 4.3 Ideals and Aspirations -- 4.4 Virtues, Persons, and The Virtuous Person -- 4.5 Representing The Virtuous Person -- Part II. The Enumeration Problem -- 5. The Enumeration Problem -- 5.1 The Enumeration Problem: An Introduction -- 5.2 Enumeration and Overall Virtuous Actions -- 5.3 Enumeration and Overall Virtuous Persons -- 5.4 Enumeration and Naturalism -- 6. Individuating the Virtues -- 6.1 From Individuation to Enumeration -- 6.2 The Same Reasons -- 6.3 Reasons, Individuation, and Cardinality -- 6.4 Implications for Hard Virtue Ethics -- 7. Magnificence, Generosity, and Subordination -- 7.1 Magnificence as a Virtue -- 7.2 Subordination, Specialization, and Cardinality -- 7.3 Alternatives to the Subordination View -- Part III. Situations, Dispositions, and Virtues -- 8. Situations and Broad-Based Dispositions -- 8.1 Situationism and Dispositionism -- 8.2 Situationism and Personality -- 8.3 Idiographic Predictions of Consistency -- 9. Situations and Dispositions: Examining the Evidence -- 9.1 How to Test Broad-Based Dispositions for Cross-Situational Consistency -- 9.2 Putting Dispositions to the Test: Four Representative Experiments -- 9.3 Interpreting the Findings -- 10. From Situationism to Virtue Theory -- 10.1 Situationism: From Empirical to Philosophical Psychology -- 10.2 Situationism and Virtue Theory: Normative Adequacy -- 10.3 From Common Sense to Virtue Theory? -- 10.4 Out-Sourcing the Empirical Work? -- 10.5 A Cognitive-Affective Approach to the Virtues -- Part IV. Defending Hard Virtue Theory -- 11. Phronesis and the Unity of the Virtues -- 11.1 The Unity of Which Virtues? -- 11.2 What Unifies the Virtues? -- 11.3 Attributive and Model Theses -- 12. Responsibility for Character -- 12.1 Depth, Self-Construction, and Responsibility -- 12.2 On Responsibility and Ultimate Responsibility for Character -- 12.3 What is Critical Distance? -- 12.4 From Critical Distance to Responsibility -- 12.5 Objections to the Critical Distance View -- Works Cited -- Index Locorum -- General Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- X -- Y -- Z.
Includes bibliographical references and index.