Why political liberalism? : on John Rawls's political turn /

In this work, Paul Weithman offers a fresh, rigorous and compelling interpretation of John Rawls' reasons for taking his so-called 'political turn'.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Weithman, Paul J., 1959-
Format:	eBook
Language:	English
Published:	New York ; Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011.
Series:	Oxford political philosophy.
Subjects:	Rawls, John, > 1921-2002 > Criticism and interpretation. Rawls, John, > 1921-2002 Justice. Liberalism. Political stability. Free enterprise. Libéralisme. Stabilité politique. liberalism. PHILOSOPHY. Political. Free enterprise Justice Liberalism Political stability Electronic books. Electronic resource. Criticism, interpretation, etc.
Online Access:	Connect to the full text of this electronic book

Table of Contents:

Cover13;
Contents
Acknowledgments
List of Tables
Introduction
1: Overview
2: The Road to Come
3: A Deeper Understanding of Justice as Fairness?
4: Unity, Theodicy, and the Attractions of Liberalism
5: A Final Word to the Reader
Chapter I: The Public Basis View
I.1: Initial Statement of the Public Basis View
I.2: The Pivotal Argument
I.3: Imputing the Pivotal Argument?
I.4: The Public Basis View Restated
I.5: Difficulties with the Strong Version
I.6: Difficulties with the Weak Version
I.7: Conclusion
Chapter II: Stability and Congruence
II. 1: Stability, Inherent and Imposed
II. 2: Matching the Right and the Good in Justice as Fairness
II. 3: Congruence and Stability
II. 4: Congruence and Inherent Stability
Chapter III: Ideals and Inconsistency
III. 1: An Inconsistency in Justice as Fairness?
III. 2: Ideals and Comprehensive Conceptions
III. 3: Endorsing on the Basis of Shared Ideals
III. 4: Congruence and C[sub(3)]
III. 5: C[sub(3)] and Inconsistency
Chapter IV: The Acquisition of Four Desires
IV. 1: Two Readings of the Aristotelian Principle
IV. 2: The Acquisition of Four Desires
IV. 3: Four Desires and Thin Reasons
Chapter V: Thin Reasons to Be Just
V.1: Setting up the Problem
V.2: The Aristotelian Principle and the Argument for Congruence
V.3: Four Thin Reasons
V.4: Some Questions about the First Three Arguments
V.5: Some Puzzles about the Fourth Argument
Chapter VI: The Argument from Love and Justice
VI. 1: Balances and Temptations
VI. 2: Two Questions about Table II. 3
VI. 3: Conditional Balances and Balance Conditionals
VI. 4: The Argument from Love and Justice
VI. 5: Love8217;s Balance
VI. 6: Four Comments on the Argument
Chapter VII: Kantian Congruence and the Unified Self
VII. 1: An Overview of the Kantian Congruence Argument
VII. 2: The Argument from C[sub(4)]a
VII. 3 From the Ostensible Conclusion to Congruence
VII. 4: Establishing (5.5')
VII. 5: Defending (5.2)
VII. 6: Finality, Rationality, and the Unity of the Self
VII. 7: Kantian Unity
VII. 8: Korsgaard, Unity and the Bridge Function
VII. 9: Is the OP Necessary?
VIII. 10: Conclusion
Chapter VIII: The Great Unraveling
VIII. 1: The Content of Ideals
VIII. 2: Defending C[sub(3)]
VIII. 3: Pluralism and the Failure of Congruence
VIII. 4: The Failure of Kantian Congruence
VIII. 5: The Great Unraveling
VIII. 6: Brief Contrasts with Other Accounts
Chapter IX: The Political Ideals of Justice as Fairness
IX. 1: PL8217;s Basic Argument for Stability
IX. 2: C[sub(3)]' and the Sense of Justice
IX. 3: C[sub(3)]' and the Ideals of Conduct
IX. 4: C[sub(3)]' and the Social Ideals of Justice as Fairness
IX. 5: Whither Congruence?
Chapter X: Comprehensive Reasons to Be Just
X.1: Moving from (9.2) and (9.3) to (9.5)
X.2: Would there Be an Overlapping Consensus?
X.3: Legitimacy and Justification
X.4: Why Political Legitimacy?
X.5: A Question about the Arguments for C[sub(9)] and C[sub(PL)]
X.6: Public Reason, Mutual Assurance, and Pluralism about Justice
X.7: Stability, Reflective Equilibrium, and Public Justification
X.8: Conclusion
Chapter XI: Conclusion
XI. 1: The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism?
XI. 2: A Conception-Based Vie.