Attention is cognitive unison : an essay in philosophical psychology /

Some psychological phenomena can be explained by identifying and describing the processes that constitute them. Others cannot be explained in that way. In this book, Christopher Mole gives a precise account of the metaphysical difference that divides these two categories.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Mole, Christopher, 1979-
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, ©2011.
Series:Philosophy of mind series.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Highlights of a difficult history
  • The preliminary identification of our topic
  • Approaches
  • Bradley's protest
  • James's disjunctive theory
  • The source of Bradley's dissatisfaction
  • Behaviourism and after
  • Heirs of Bradley in the twentieth century
  • The underlying metaphysical issue
  • Explanatory tactics
  • The basic distinction
  • Metaphysical categories and taxonomies
  • Adverbialism, multiple realizability, and natural kinds
  • Adverbialism and levels of explanation
  • Taxonomies and supervenience relations
  • Rejecting the process : first view
  • Supervenience-failure
  • The modal commitments of the process : first view
  • The interference argument : a putative problem for adverbialist accounts
  • Cognitive unison
  • The problem with attitude based adverbialism
  • Gilbert Ryle and Alan White
  • White's argument against disposition-based adverbialism
  • The cognitive unison theory
  • Tasks
  • Cognitive processes
  • Potential service of a task
  • Superordinate tasks
  • Some features of the theory
  • Divided attention
  • Degrees of attention and merely partial attention
  • The causal life of attention
  • Mental causation
  • How to respond to mental causation objections
  • The causal role of attention
  • Attention as an enabling condition
  • Counterfactuals
  • The causal relevance of attention per se
  • Counterfactuals and causally relevant properties
  • Objections to counterfactual analysis of causation and of causal relevance
  • The extrinsicness of unison
  • The privative character of unison and the problem of absence causation
  • Causal exclusion
  • Consequences for cognitive psychology
  • Psychology and metaphysics
  • The metaphysical commitments of the process-identifying project
  • The diverse explanatory construals of current psychological results
  • Reasons for deflation
  • Inductively unreliable properties
  • Questions without answers
  • The positive payoff
  • Philosophical work for the theory of attention
  • Putting attention to philosophical work
  • Attention and reference
  • Attention and consciousness
  • Prospects for optimism.