http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
This book provides a radical alternative to naturalistic theories of content, and offers a new conception of the place of mind in the world. Confronting head-on the scientific conception of the nature of reality that has dominated the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, Michael Morris here presents a detailed analysis of content and propositional attitudes, based on the idea that truth is a value. In the course of this analysis he rejects the causal theory of the explanation of behaviour and replaces it with an alternative which depends upon a rich conception of the behaviour we explain with reference to states of mind. According to the theory presented here, our understanding of other people is inextricably involved with our evaluation of what they do, and the objectivity of truth depends upon the objectivity of moral goodness. Dr Morris's clear and detailed exposition of his controversial argument sounds an emphatic challenge to the naturalistic orthodoxy in metaphysics, ethics, and cognitive science.
pt. I. Metaphysics and Contents. 1. Philosophical Theories and Metaphysical Schemes. 1.1. Theories of content and metaphysical presuppositions. 1.2. Some basic terminology. 1.3. Conceptualism, Platonism, and the no-theory view. 2. Conceptualism is Kantian. 2.1. A Kantian conception of interesting explanations. 2.2. A Kantian rejection of Platonism. 3. Informativeness. 4. Scientism. 4.1. Scientism as a general metaphysical scheme. 4.2. The first argument against scientism. 4.3. The second argument against scientism. 4.4. Further remarks on scientism. 5. A Proposal for a Scientific Metaphysics. 5.1. The knowledge constraint. 5.2. Is the knowledge constraint verificationist? 5.3. Explanatory priority -- pt. II. The Shape of a Theory of Content. 6. What is a Theory of Content?
6.1. The topic. 6.2. Content and the knowledge constraint. 6.3. Sense and meaning. 7. Unified Externalism. 7.1. The basic argument. 7.2. Objections to singular thoughts. 7.3. Dual componency. 7.4. Unified externalism and causal reductionism. 8. The Explanation of Behaviour. 8.1. An anodyne constraint. 8.2. The 'folk-psychology' myth. 8.3. Unpicking the myth. 8.4. The onus of proof. 8.5. Descartes's ghost and the 'mind-body problem'. 8.6. The rediscovery of Descartes's ghost. 8.7. Conclusion -- pt. III. An Evaluative Theory of Content. 9. The Core of a Theory. 9.1. The theory in outline. 9.2. Is truth a value? 9.3. Values and reduction. 9.4. The 'is'-'ought' distinction. 9.5. A more precise formulation of the theory. 10. Intrinsic Assessability.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL
Includes bibliographical references (pages 329-332) and index.
Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1992