http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
It's an obvious enough observation that the standards that govern whether ordinary speakers will say that someone knows something vary with context: What we are happy to call "knowledge" in some ("low-standards") contexts we'll deny is "knowledge" in other ("high-standards") contexts. But do these varying standards for when ordinary speakers will attribute knowledge, and for when they are in some important sense warranted in attributing knowledge, reflect varying standards for whenit is or would be true for them to attribute knowledge? Or are the standar.
1. Introduction: Contextualism, Invariantism, Skepticism, and What Goes On in Ordinary Conversation; 2. The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism; 3. Assertion, Knowledge, and Context; 4. Single Scoreboard Semantics; 5. 'Bamboozled by our Own Words': Semantic Blindness and Some Objections to Contextualism; 6. Now You Know It, Now You Don't: Intellectualism, Contextualism, and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism; 7. Knowledge, Assertion, and Action: Contextualism vs. Subject-Sensitive Invariantism; References; Index.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Knowledge, skepticism, and context ; v. 1