http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
Thinking About Consciousness is a discussion of recent physicalist ideas about consciousness, written in an accessible style by David Papineau.
Introduction. Mystery, what mystery? --The intuition of distinctness -- A need for therapy -- Ontological monism, conceptual dualism -- Understanding the intuition of distinctness -- The details of materialism -- The plan of the book.
The case for materialism. The causal argument -- The ontology of causes -- Epiphenomenalism and pre-established harmony -- Accepting overdetermination -- Functionalism and epiphobia -- A possible cure for epiphobia -- Intuition and supervenience -- An argument from a priori causal roles -- What is physics? -- The completeness of physics.
Conceptual dualism. Jackson's knowledge argument -- Denying any difference -- Imaginative re-creation -- Introspective classification -- The ability hypothesis -- Indexicality and phenomenal concepts -- The contingency of learning from experience -- Imagination and introspection -- Further issues.
The impossibility of zombies. Epistemology versus metaphysics -- The appearance of contingency -- Explaining the appearance of contingency -- Referring via contingent properties -- A different explanation -- Thinking impossible things -- conceivability and possibility -- The intuition of distinctness.
Phenomenal concepts. Psychological, phenomenal, and everyday concepts -- Phenomenal properties provide their own modes of presentation -- World-directed perceptual re-creation and classification -- Perceptual concepts -- How do perceptual concepts refer? -- The phenomenal co-option of perceptual concepts -- A quotational model -- Indexicality and the quotational model -- The causal basis of phenomenal reference -- Phenomenal concepts and privacy -- First-person incorrigibility -- Third-person uses of phenomenal concepts.
The explanatory gap. Mark Twain, Samuel Clemens, and intuitions of gaps -- Reduction, roles, and explanation -- Does materialism require the physical truths to imply all the truths? -- An epistemological gap.
The intuition of distinctness. Is an explanation already to hand? -- Does conceptual dualism explain the intuition of distinctness? -- Nagel's footnote -- The antipathetic fallacy -- Do phenomenal concepts resemble their objects?
Prospects for the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness. The limitations of consciousness research -- Phenomenal and psychological research -- Subjects' first-person reports -- Consciousness-as-such -- Methodological impotence -- Further alternatives -- Vague phenomenal concepts -- Vagueness defended -- Theories of consciousness-as-such -- Actualist HOT theories -- Attention -- The dispositional HOT theory -- Methodological meltdown -- Representational theories of consciousness -- Vagueness and consciousness-as-such.
Appendix. The history of the completeness of physics. Descartes and Leibniz -- Newtonian physics -- The conservation of energy -- Conservative animism -- The death of emergentism.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 257-262) and index.
Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2002