rdf-syntax-grammar
mods:
  schema location: http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
  title info:
    title: Belief about the self
    sub title: a defense of the property theory of content
  name:
    name part: Feit, Neil.
    role:
      role term: creator
  name:
    name part: Oxford University Press
  type of resource: text
  genre: bibliography
  genre: Electronic books.
  origin info:
    place:
      place term: enk
    place:
      place term: Oxford
    place:
      place term: New York
    publisher: Oxford University Press
    date issued: 2008
    issuance: monographic
  language:
    language term: eng
  physical description:
    form: remote
    extent: 1 online resource (xvi, 195 pages)
  abstract: Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions - things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self.
  table of contents: Mental content and the problem of De Se belief -- Cognitive attitudes and content -- The doctrine of propositions -- The problem of De Se belief -- The property theory of content -- In favor of the property theory -- Perry's messy shopper and the argument from explanation -- Lewis's case of the two Gods -- Arguments from internalism and physicalism -- An inference to the best explanation -- Alternatives to the property theory -- The triadic view of belief -- How the property theory and the triadic view are rivals -- Dyadic propositionalism reconsidered -- Arguments against the property theory -- Self-ascription and self-awareness -- Nonexistence and impossible contents -- Stalnaker's argument -- Propositionalist arguments from inference -- The property theory and De Re belief -- Lewis's account of De Re belief -- McKay's objection to Lewis -- Mistaken identity and the case of the shy secret admirer -- Some other worries and concluding remarks -- The property theory, rationality, and Kripke's puzzle about belief -- Kripke's puzzle about belief -- The puzzle argument -- A solution to the puzzle -- Puzzles with empty names and kind terms -- The property theory, twin earth, and belief about kinds -- Twin earth and two kinds of internalism -- The twin earth argument -- An internalist response (stage one) -- An internalist response (stage two) -- Self-ascription and belief about kinds.
  note: Neil Feit.
  note: Includes bibliographical references (pages 187-191) and index.
  note: English.
  subject:
    topic: Self (Philosophy)
  subject:
    topic: Moi (Philosophie)
  subject:
    topic: PHILOSOPHY
    topic: Mind & Body
  subject:
    topic: PSYCHOLOGY
    topic: Personality
  subject:
    topic: Self (Philosophy)
  classification: BD450 .F388 2008
  classification: 126
  classification: CC 4800
  classification: CC 5500
  classification: CC 6600
  classification: 5,1
  related item:
    title info:
      title: Belief about the self
    name:
      name part: Feit, Neil.
    origin info:
      publisher: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2008
    identifier: (DLC) 2007039746
    identifier: (OCoLC)173683589
  identifier: 9780199712267
  identifier: 0199712263
  identifier: 9780199866922
  identifier: 0199866929
  identifier: 9780195341362
  identifier: 0195341368
  identifier: 0190450924
  identifier: 9780190450922
  identifier: 1281852139
  identifier: 9781281852137
  identifier: 9786611852139
  identifier: 6611852131
  identifier: 2007039746
  identifier: http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login
  record info:
    record content source: LGG
    record creation date: 070925
    record change date: 20260318174229.3
    record identifier: in00005703634
    language of cataloging:
      language term: eng