Belief about the self : a defense of the property theory of content /
Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions - things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of b...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Language Notes: | English. |
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Oxford ; New York :
Oxford University Press,
2008.
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| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
| Summary: | Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions - things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self. |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (xvi, 195 pages) |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 187-191) and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780199712267 0199712263 9780199866922 0199866929 0190450924 9780190450922 1281852139 9781281852137 9786611852139 6611852131 |