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Kantian humility : our ignorance of things in themselves /

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Langton offers an interpretation and defence of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. He aims to vindicate Kant's scientific realism, and show his primary/secondary quality distinction to be superior.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Langton, Rae, 1961-
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford ; New York : Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, ©1998.
Subjects:
Kant, Immanuel, > 1724-1804.
Kant, Immanuel, > 1724-1804
Ding an sich.
Chose en soi.
PHILOSOPHY > Metaphysics.
Ding an sich
Kennistheorie.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Intro
  • Contents
  • Note on Sources and Abbreviations
  • Introduction
  • 1. AN OLD PROBLEM
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Allison's Deflationary Proposal
  • 3. Reasons for Suspicion
  • 4. A Metaphysical Proposal, and an Acid Test Passed
  • 2. THREE KANTIAN THESES
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Bennett on Two Distinctions and their Conflation
  • 3. A Case For, and Against, the 'Bare Substratum'
  • 4. Three Theses: Some Further Texts
  • 5. The Distinction
  • 6. Humility
  • 7. Receptivity
  • 3. SUBSTANCE AND PHENOMENAL SUBSTANCE
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Pure Concept of Substance vs. the Schematized
  • 3. The Concept of Phenomenal Substance in General
  • 4. Matter as a Merely Comparative Subject
  • 5. Note on the Inference to Substance
  • 6. Concluding Remarks and New Business
  • 4. LEIBNIZ AND KANT
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Kant's Version of Leibniz
  • 3. A Distinction between Phenomena and Things in Themselves
  • 4. A Reduction of Phenomena to Things in Themselves
  • 5. Knowledge, via Phenomena, of Things in Themselves
  • 6. Kant and Leibniz on Relations
  • 5. KANT'S REJECTION OF REDUCIBILITY
  • 1. An Early Distinction between Phenomena and Things in Themselves
  • 2. The Principle of Succession, and Receptivity
  • 3. The Principle of Coexistence, and Irreducibility
  • 4. Analysis of the Argument for Irreducibility: Preliminaries
  • 5. Irreducibility Argument I
  • 6. Irreducibility Argument II
  • 7. Concluding Remarks
  • 6. FITTING THE PIECES TOGETHER
  • 1. Assembly
  • 2. An Imaginative Exercise
  • 3. Kant, Leibniz, and a Mirror Broken
  • 4. Later Signs of the Irreducibility Argument
  • 7. A COMPARISON WITH LOCKE
  • 1. A Phenomenalist Reading of the Comparison
  • 2. Problems, and a Contradiction
  • 3. A Different Lockean Distinction
  • 4. A Contradiction Dissolved
  • 5. A Closer Look
  • 8. KANT'S 'PRIMARY' QUALITIES
  • 1. Introduction.
  • 2. Bennett's Instructive Mistake
  • 3. Spatial Features and Space-Filling Features
  • 4. A Caveat about Space
  • 5. Kant's 'Primary' Qualities: Geometrical and Dynamical
  • 6. Solidity vs. Impenetrability, and a Problem for a Contemporary Orthodoxy
  • 7. Science: Primary vs. Tertiary Qualities
  • 8. Objectivity: Primary vs. Tertiary Qualities
  • 9. THE UNOBSERVABLE AND THE SUPERSENSIBLE
  • 1. Experience and the Unobservable
  • 2. The Kant-Eberhard Controversy: Unobservable vs. Supersensible
  • 3. Observability and Community
  • 4. Monadology, Well vs. Badly Understood
  • 5. Final Comments
  • 10. REALISM OR IDEALISM?
  • 1. Summing Up
  • 2. Idealism: First Impressions
  • 3. Idealism: Things in Themselves
  • 4. Idealism: Space
  • Bibliography
  • Index
  • A
  • B
  • C
  • D
  • E
  • F
  • G
  • H
  • I
  • J
  • K
  • L
  • M
  • N
  • O
  • P
  • R
  • S
  • T
  • V
  • W.