Firms, contracts, and financial structure /
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic relationships and institutions such as firms. The basic argument is that in a world of incomplete contracts, institutional arrangements are designed to allocate power among agents.
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford : New York :
Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press,
1995.
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| Series: | Clarendon lectures in economics.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Connect to the full text of this electronic book |
| Summary: | This book provides a framework for thinking about economic relationships and institutions such as firms. The basic argument is that in a world of incomplete contracts, institutional arrangements are designed to allocate power among agents. |
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| Item Description: | "Clarendon lectures in economics"--Cover |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (viii, 228 pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 211-222) and index. |
| ISBN: | 9786611989538 6611989536 0191521728 9780191521720 9780191596353 0191596353 9780191606885 019160688X |