Firms, contracts, and financial structure /

This book provides a framework for thinking about economic relationships and institutions such as firms. The basic argument is that in a world of incomplete contracts, institutional arrangements are designed to allocate power among agents.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hart, Oliver D.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : New York : Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1995.
Series:Clarendon lectures in economics.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Description
Summary:This book provides a framework for thinking about economic relationships and institutions such as firms. The basic argument is that in a world of incomplete contracts, institutional arrangements are designed to allocate power among agents.
Item Description:"Clarendon lectures in economics"--Cover
Physical Description:1 online resource (viii, 228 pages) : illustrations
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references (pages 211-222) and index.
ISBN:9786611989538
6611989536
0191521728
9780191521720
9780191596353
0191596353
9780191606885
019160688X