http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
This text presents a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. In the tradition of Plato and G.E. Moore, Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them.
pt. 1. Realism and its critics. The non-cognitivist challenge -- The constructivist challenge -- pt. 2. Moral metaphysics. Ethical non-naturalism -- Supervenience and causation -- pt. 3. Moral motivation. Motivational humeanism -- Motivational judgement [sic] internalism -- pt. 4. Moral reasons. Reasons internalism -- Moral rationalism -- Rationality and disagreement -- pt. 5. Moral knowledge. Moral skepticism -- The justification of moral principles -- The justification of verdictive beliefs.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 303-312) and index.
Oxford : Clarendon ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2003