http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
a critique of John McDowell's empiricism
Gaskin argues that John McDowell's attempt to revive the doctrine of empiricism in a 'minimal' or 'transcendental' form is seriously undermined by inadequacies in the way he conceives what he styles the 'order of justification' connecting world, experience, and judgement.
Minimal empiricism and the 'order of justification' -- Minimal empiricism : introductory -- Minimal empiricism : some initial difficulties -- McDowell's empiricism : overview and prospective -- The simple model of empirical content -- The 'order of justification' -- From the complex to the simple model of empirical content -- Experience and causation -- Causation and the complex model of empirical content -- The threat of Anomalous Monism -- Causation in the space of reasons -- Nature and supernature -- Rampant and naturalized platonisms -- Realm-o-flaw causation and the myth of the given -- Experience and judgement -- McDowell's transcendental argument -- Judgement and freedom -- Knowledge and the opportunity to know -- Knowledge and infallibility -- Ayer on perceptual error -- Experience and self-consciousness -- The 'highest common factor' conception of experience -- McDowell's individualism -- Externalism and the individual -- Externalism and the 'order of justification' -- The mental lives of infants and animals -- Two species of mentality -- Mentality and the transcendental argument -- Objections to McDowell's account -- Conceptual consciousness and the Private Language Argument -- Not a something, but not a nothing either -- Feeling pain and feeling a pain -- Mentality and conceptual sophistication -- Two species of mentality revisited -- Mentality and propositional content -- Diagnosis and treatment -- The ailment : Kantian transcendental idealism -- Sense, reference, and concepts -- Propositions and states of affairs -- Concepts and nominalism -- Wittgenstein and ultra-realism -- Ultrarealism and universals -- The world's own language -- Combining objects and concepts at the level of reference -- Locating propositions at the level of reference -- The problem of falsity -- Truth and intrinsicism -- Der Mensch spricht nicht allein -- Epilogue : the unity of the proposition.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 235-246) and index.
Oxford : Clarendon Press ; Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2006