Cover Image

Repeated games and reputations : long-run relationships /

Show other versions (1)

Provides a complete treatment of the theory of repeated games and reputations, beginning with the elementary concepts required to work with repeated games and continuing to research frontier. This book is for those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Mailath, George Joseph
Other Authors: Samuelson, Larry, 1953-
Format: eBook
Language:English
Language Notes:English.
Published: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2006.
Subjects:
Game theory.
Economics, Mathematical.
Game Theory
Théorie des jeux.
Mathématiques économiques.
MATHEMATICS > Game Theory.
Economics, Mathematical
Game theory
Prestige
Spieltheorie
Wirtschaftsmathematik
Speltheorie.
Spieltheorie.
Electronic books.
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Description
Summary:Provides a complete treatment of the theory of repeated games and reputations, beginning with the elementary concepts required to work with repeated games and continuing to research frontier. This book is for those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Physical Description:1 online resource (xvi, 645 pages) : illustrations
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references (pages 619-628) and index.
ISBN:9781429440271
1429440279
9780199783700
0199783705
9786611162856
6611162852
0198041217
9780198041214
0195300793
9780195300796