http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
a unitary approach to models and scientific reasoning
Explores the consequences of adopting a 'pragmatic' notion of truth in the philosophy of science. This framework describes issues to do with belief, theory acceptance, and the realism-antirealism debate, as well as the nature of scientific models and their heuristic development.
Introduction: Aims and Overview -- 1. Truth, the Whole Truth, and Partial Truth -- 2. Theories and Models -- 3. Models and Models -- 4. Acceptance, Belief, and Commitment -- 5. Inconsistency in Science -- 6. Partiality, Pursuit, and Practice -- 7. Quasi Truth and the Nature of Induction -- 8. From Pragmatic Realism to Structural Empiricism -- 9. Extensions.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 235-252) and index.
New York : Oxford University Press, 2003
Oxford studies in the philosophy of science