http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
This text discusses why we do things and the reasons why we should. It maintains that current philosophical orthodoxy bowdlerises this relation, making it impossible to understand how anyone can act for a good reason.
1. Reasons for Action -- 1. Good Reasons and those for which the Agent Acted -- 2. The Reason Why -- 3. Other Versions of the Motivating-Normative Distinction -- 4. Justification and Explanation -- 5. Four More Distinctions -- 6. Looking Back and Looking Forward -- Appendix. The History of the Distinction between Motivating and Normative Reasons -- 2. Reasons and Desires -- 1. Internalism and Desire-Based Reasons -- 2. Against Desire-Based Reasons -- Appendix. Korsgaard on Instrumental Reason -- 3. Reasons and Beliefs -- 1. Moral Reasons and Beliefs -- 2. Practical Reasons and Beliefs -- Appendix. On Detaching -- 4. The Theory of Motivating States -- 1. The Structure of a Complete Motivating State -- 2. Normativity and the Explanation of Action -- 5. Acting for a Good Reason -- 1. Psychologism: The Three-Part Story and the Normative Story -- 2. Against the Three-Part Story -- 3. Explanation by Appeal to Content -- 6. As I Believe -- 1. Because he Believes that p -- 2. The Role of Belief in the Psychologizing Restatement of a Reason -- 3. Factive and Non-Factive Explanations -- 7. Consequential Matters -- 1. Disjunctive Conceptions -- 2. Metaphysical Difficulties -- 3. Internalism and Desire-Based Reasons Again -- 4. Defusing Internalism -- 5. Degrees of Objectivity -- 8. How Many Explanations? -- 1. Explanation and Causal Explanation -- 2. Combining the Causal and the Normative -- 3. Further Causal Explanations -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 179-184) and index.
Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2000