http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd
This title revisits the traditional explanation of freedom of will. O'Connor defines it as reason-guided agent causation and places his argument within a general metaphysics.
Contents -- Introduction -- 1. Freedom and Determinism -- 1.1 An Ancient Argument -- 1.2 Some Modal Principles and the Argument for Incompatibilism -- 1.3 The Fixity of the Past and of Natural Laws -- 1.4 Freedom and Responsibility -- 2. Freedom and Indeterminism: Some Unsatisfactory Proposals -- 2.1 The Trouble with Incompatibilism -- 2.2 Simple Indeterminism: Carl Ginet on Choice and Control -- 2.3 Causal Indeterminism: The General Strategy and a Problem Posed -- 3. The Agent as Cause: Reid, Taylor, and Chisholm -- 3.1 The Agency Theory -- 3.2 Thomas Reid
3.3 Richard Taylor3.4 Roderick Chisholm -- 3.5 Summary -- Appendix: Chisholm's Later Writings on Agency -- 4. The Metaphysics of Free Will -- 4.1 Overview -- 4.2 Event Causation -- 4.3 Agent Causation -- 4.4 C.D. Broad's Objection to the Very Idea of Agent Causation -- 4.5 Remarks on a Contemporary Alternative Account of Agent Causation -- 4.6 Ersatz Agent Causation? -- 4.7 Alternative Possibilities, Responsibility, and Agent Causation -- 5. Reasons and Causes -- 5.1 Reasons Explanation and the Agency Theory -- 5.2 Objections to the Account
5.3 Reasons and Contrastive Explanation5.4 Reasons and Tendencies to Act: A Residual Problem and a Speculative Proposal -- 5.5 When Is the Will Free? -- 5.6 Conclusion -- 6. Agency, Mind, and Reductionism -- 6.1 Introductory Polemics: 'The Emerging Scientific Picture of the World' -- 6.2 Emergence -- 6.3 Emergence and Consciousness -- 6.4 The Emergence of Active Power -- 6.5 An Epistemological Objection to Agent Causation -- 6.6 Conclusion -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N
Includes bibliographical references (pages 127-132) and index.
New York : Oxford University Press, 2000