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|a STBDS
|b eng
|e rda
|e pn
|c STBDS
|d OCLCO
|d OCLCF
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|d OCLCQ
|d CLOUD
|d OCLCO
|d IUL
|d OCLCQ
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| 020 |
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|a 9780191965555
|q ebook
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|a 0191965553
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|z 9780192869500
|q (hardback)
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| 024 |
7 |
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|a 10.1093/oso/9780192869500.001.0001
|2 doi
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| 035 |
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|a (OCoLC)1406150198
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| 050 |
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4 |
|a BD171
|b .W7 2023
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|a 121
|2 23
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| 049 |
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|a TXAM
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| 100 |
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|a Wrenn, Chase B.,
|d 1974-
|e author.
|1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJpDMKfWRDxPyGRYQpFVG3
|
| 245 |
1 |
4 |
|a The true and the good :
|b a strong virtue theory of the value of truth /
|c Chase B. Wrenn.
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| 264 |
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1 |
|a Oxford :
|b Oxford University Press,
|c [2023]
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| 264 |
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4 |
|c ©2023
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| 300 |
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|a 1 online resource.
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| 336 |
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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| 337 |
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|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
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| 338 |
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|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
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| 500 |
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|a Also issued in print: 2023.
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| 504 |
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|a Includes bibliographical references and index.
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| 520 |
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|a This book explains the Problem of Truth's Value and offers a virtue-theoretic solution to it. The Problem of Truth's Value arises because it is hard to reconcile good theories of truth's nature with good theories of why we should value truth. Some theories build value into the very nature of truth, but they tend to obscure the connection between what is true and how things are in the world. Other theories treat truth as a purely descriptive feature of claims. They struggle to explain how such a feature could make something good or right to believe. To solve the problem, this book proposes a "Strong Virtue Theory" of truth's value. On that theory, truth is worth caring about, but not because of any pre-existing value that inheres in states of true belief. Instead, truth is worth caring about because caring about truth is a moral virtue; it is part of being a morally good person. The book offers an account of Truthfulness as a moral virtue, independent of any value that inheres in states of true belief. It also criticizes several alternative ways of explaining truth's value. Those alternatives include the idea that truth is inherently normative, the idea that truth makes beliefs intrinsically or instrumentally valuable, and the idea that truth confers a special sort of "epistemic value" on beliefs.
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| 521 |
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|a Specialized.
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| 588 |
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|a Description based on online resource; title from home page (Oxford Academic, viewed February 12, 2025).
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|a Cover -- The True and the Good: A Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- 1: The Problem of Truth's Value -- 1.1 Our Interest in the Truth -- 1.2 Two Conceptions of Truth -- 1.2.1 Normativism -- 1.2.2 Aristotelianism -- 1.3 Solving the Problem of Truth's Value -- 1.4 Roadmap -- 1.5 Conventions -- 2: Truth and Virtue -- 2.1 The Value-Conferral Model -- 2.2 Virtues -- 2.3 Truthfulness and Its Rivals -- 2.4 Why Truthfulness Is a Virtue -- 2.4.1 Trustworthiness and the Collaborative Pursuit of the Good -- 2.4.2 Epistemic Justice -- 2.4.3 Polarization -- 2.4.4 A Society Worth Having -- 2.5 Beyond the Value-Conferral Model -- 2.6 State-Given Reasons -- 2.7 Conclusion -- 3: Truth-Oriented Desires -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Why Truth-Oriented Desires? -- 3.3 Desiring Truth -- 3.4 Horwich's Proposal -- 3.4.1 The Deflationism of Horwich's Proposal -- 3.4.2 Hasty Generalization -- 3.4.3 Particularism -- 3.5 Deflationism and Valuing Truth -- 3.5.1 A Non-Reductive Deflationism -- 3.5.2 Valuing Truth Generically -- 3.6 Conclusion -- 4: Against Normativism -- 4.1 Why Not Normativism? -- 4.2 The Core Commitments of Normativism -- 4.3 Blindspots and Brightspots -- 4.4 Deflationary Normativism? -- 4.5 The Aristotelian Advantage -- 5: Truth and Instrumental Value -- 5.1 The Instrumental Value-Conferral Model -- 5.2 The Standard Arguments -- 5.3 Against Truth's Instrumental Value -- 5.4 Instrumentally Valuing Truth -- 6: Truth and Intrinsic Value -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 What Is Intrinsic Value? -- 6.3 Pointlessness -- 6.4 Minimal Intrinsic Value -- 6.5 Incommensurability -- 6.6 Vanishing Value -- 6.6.1 Valuing Truth Is Good for Us -- 6.6.2 Value Autonomization and Evaluative Conditioning -- 6.6.3 Truth as the Internal Goal of Belief -- 6.7 Modes of Valuing, Deflationism, and the Strong Virtue Theory.
|
| 505 |
8 |
|
|a 7: Truth and Epistemic Standards -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Regulative Epistemic Value-Conferral Model -- 7.3 Horwich Against the Truth-PromotionStandard -- 7.4 Rattan and Critical Reflection -- 7.5 Triviality's Return -- 7.6 Reconsidering Truth's Epistemic Value -- 7.7 The Strong Virtue Theory and Truth as a Regulative Epistemic Good -- 8: Truth as the Goal of Inquiry -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Against True Beliefs as the Goal of Inquiry -- 8.3 Sincerely and Rationally Pursuing Goals -- 8.4 Inquiring When You Have the Answer -- 8.5 Sham Inquiry -- 8.6 Inquisitive Attitudes -- 8.7 Probabilistically "Having an Answer" -- 8.8 Alternative Interpretations of the Cases -- 8.9 A Different View of Inquiry's Goal -- 8.10 The Strong Virtue Theory and Final Epistemic Value -- 9: Conclusion: The Strong Virtue Theory -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Recapitulation -- 9.3 Alternative Theories and Minimal Theoretical Resources -- Bibliography -- Index.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Truth.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Values.
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| 650 |
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6 |
|a Vérité.
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a truth.
|2 aat
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a PHILOSOPHY.
|2 bisacsh
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Metaphysics.
|2 bisacsh
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Political.
|2 bisacsh
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Truth
|2 fast
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Values
|2 fast
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge.
|2 thema
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Philosophy.
|2 ukslc
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| 655 |
|
7 |
|a Electronic books.
|2 local
|
| 776 |
0 |
8 |
|i Print version:
|a Wrenn, Chase B., 1974-
|t True and the good.
|d Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, [2023]
|z 0192869507
|w (OCoLC)1381441598
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u http://proxy.library.tamu.edu/login?url=https://academic.oup.com/book/55254
|z Connect to the full text of this electronic book
|t 0
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| 936 |
|
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|a BATCHLOAD
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| 955 |
|
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|a Oxford Scholarship Online
|
| 994 |
|
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|a 92
|b TXA
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| 999 |
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f |
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|s d3c62458-297d-4242-b6f8-15f84b6d697d
|t 0
|
| 952 |
f |
f |
|a Texas A&M University
|b College Station
|c Electronic Resources
|s www_evans
|d Available Online
|t 0
|e BD171 .W7 2023
|h Library of Congress classification
|
| 998 |
f |
f |
|a BD171 .W7 2023
|t 0
|l Available Online
|