Coherence between data protection and competition law in digital markets /

'Coherence between Data Protection and Competition Law in Digital Markets' offers a blueprint for a more synergetic and mutually reinforcing approach towards data protection and competition law, anchored in the theory of 'sectional coherence.'

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Majcher, Klaudia (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2023.
Edition:First edition.
Series:Oxford data protection and privacy law.
Subjects:
Online Access:Connect to the full text of this electronic book
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Series
  • Coherence between Data Protection and Competition Law in Digital Markets
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Table of Cases
  • Table of Legislation
  • List of Abbreviations
  • Introduction
  • A. Entanglements between data protection and competition law in digital markets
  • B. A blueprint for a coherent future
  • 1. An Overview of EU Data Protection and Competition Law
  • A. Introduction
  • B. A glimpse into the evolution of data protection and competition law
  • 1. The gradual emergence of data protection law in Europe
  • 2. Competition law as a central pillar of European integration
  • C. The fundamental rationale and goals
  • 1. The bifurcated objective in data protection law
  • 2. The multiplicity of objectives in competition law
  • D. The key features and concepts
  • 1. Data protection law
  • 1.1 Selected new features of the GDPR
  • 1.2 GDPR's material and territorial scope
  • 1.3 The obligations of data controllers and the rights of data subjects
  • 1.4 Institutions and enforcement
  • 2. Competition law
  • 2.1 Abuse of a dominant position
  • 2.2 Merger control
  • E. A comparative summary
  • 2. Common Objectives and the Triple Challenge
  • A. Introduction
  • B. Common objectives
  • 1. Protecting individual welfare
  • 2. Strengthening individual sovereignty
  • 3. Ensuring fairness
  • 4. Mitigating power asymmetries
  • 5. Improving transparency and mitigating information asymmetries
  • C. The triple challenge
  • 1. 'Datafication' of the economy and society
  • 1.1 The race for a data advantage
  • 1.1.1 Data tracking
  • 1.1.2 Inference analytics
  • 1.2 The ubiquity of data-​based and data-​supported business models
  • 1.2.1 Personalized advertising
  • 1.2.2 Personalized online content and experience
  • 1.3 Opacity and lack of transparency
  • 2. The lack of competitive dynamism
  • 2.1 Concentration of power and wealth.
  • 2.2 Features and factors driving concentration
  • 3. Technological innovations and new ways of interacting with technologies
  • 3.1 Internet of Things
  • 3.2 Cloud computing
  • 3.3 Blockchain
  • 3.4 Metaverse
  • D. Conclusions
  • 3. Mapping the Interactions: Status Quo
  • A. Introduction
  • B. Data protection-​agnostic competition law
  • 1. Understanding the interactions: the extensive global policy discourse
  • 2. Testing competition law boundaries through enforcement
  • 2.1 The initial silo approach
  • 2.2 Continued reluctance in merger cases
  • 2.2.1 Facebook/​WhatsApp
  • 2.2.2 Microsoft/​LinkedIn
  • 2.2.3 Google/​Fitbit
  • 2.2.4 Meta/​Giphy
  • 2.3 Experimentation in abuse of dominance and monopolization cases
  • 2.3.1 Data protection and exploitative abuses
  • 2.3.2 Data protection and exclusionary abuses
  • 2.3.3 Data protection-​washing as an emerging concern
  • 3. New policy and regulatory initiatives
  • 3.1 Abuse of a dominant position: between legal updates and soft law measures
  • 3.2 Merger control: the focus on jurisdictional aspects
  • 3.3 Ex ante instruments complementing competition law
  • 4. Preliminary conclusions
  • C. Competition-​agnostic data protection law
  • 1. The lack of effective enforcement
  • 1.1 Effective data protection enforcement as a precondition for well-​functioning competition
  • 1.2 The challenge of the one-​stop-​shop mechanism
  • 1.3 Data subjects' access to justice: a legal limbo
  • 2. The fragmentation of the data protection landscape
  • 3. Data protection law provisions that impede competition
  • 4. Data protection law provisions that (allegedly) support competition
  • 5. Preliminary conclusions
  • D. The lack of institutional bridges
  • 1. Institutional reforms in the policy discourse
  • 2. Institutional initiatives
  • E. Conclusions
  • 4. Sectional Coherence as a New Paradigm
  • A. Introduction.
  • B. Coherence in legal theory
  • 1. Definition of coherence
  • 2. Horizontal dimension of coherence
  • 2.1 Global and local coherence
  • 2.2 Sectional coherence as a new dimension
  • 3. The normative force of coherence
  • 3.1 Formal and moral significance of coherence
  • 3.2 Maximum rational acceptability of coherence-​based interpretations
  • C. Coherence in EU law
  • D. Conclusions
  • 5. A Competition Law Perspective on Sectional Coherence
  • A. Introduction
  • B. Data power
  • 1. Data power as a sub-​category of market power
  • 2. A taxonomy of data power
  • 2.1 Economic data power
  • 2.2 Political data power
  • 2.3 Individual data power
  • 3. Assessing data power in digital markets
  • C. Abuse of a dominant position
  • 1. Theories of harm
  • 1.1 Exploitative abuses and data protection
  • 1.1.1 Unfair 'personal data trading conditions'
  • 1.1.2 Unfair 'personal data prices'
  • 1.1.3 Price discrimination as another type of exploitation
  • 1.2 Exclusionary abuses and data protection
  • 1.2.1 Tying
  • 1.2.2 Refusals to deal
  • 1.2.3 Other types of exclusion
  • 2. Justifications
  • 2.1 An objective justification defence
  • 2.2 Data protection as an objective justification
  • 3. Remedies
  • 3.1 Behavioural remedies
  • 3.1.1 Supply side data remedies
  • 3.1.2 Demand side data remedies
  • 3.1.3 Institutional and other considerations
  • 3.2 Structural remedies
  • D. Merger control
  • 1. Theories of harm
  • 1.1 Theories of harm based on a data advantage
  • 1.2 Theories of harm based on data protection
  • 1.2.1 Data protection as a dimension of competition
  • 1.2.2 Data protection as a stand-​alone consideration
  • 1.3 A stricter approach to conglomerate mergers
  • 2. Justifications
  • 2.1 An efficiency defence in the area of merger control
  • 2.2 Data protection as an efficiency defence
  • 3. Remedies
  • 3.1 Structural remedies
  • 3.2 Behavioural remedies.
  • E. Conclusions
  • 6. A Data Protection Law Perspective on Sectional Coherence
  • A. Introduction
  • B. Accounting for market power in data protection assessments
  • 1. The risk-​based approach: defining the scale of obligations
  • 1.1 From reckoning with size to reckoning with risk
  • 1.2 Approximating the concepts of risk and power
  • 2. Balancing: measuring the scope of interference
  • 2.1 Balancing and data protection legal bases
  • 2.2 Legitimate interest
  • 2.3 Consent
  • 2.3.1 Consent as the condition for a service
  • 2.3.2 The conditionality is not present in the context of consent
  • C. Stimulating competition on data protection: beyond individual empowerment
  • 1. The empowerment ideal
  • 2. Beyond individual empowerment: stimulating competition 'to the top'?
  • 2.1 The weakness of the individualistic dimension of data protection
  • 2.1.1 The right to explanation as an illustration
  • 2.1.2 A critical perspective
  • 2.2 The promise of fostering the collective dimension of data protection
  • D. Limiting unintended competition repercussions
  • E. Conclusions
  • 7. The Big Picture
  • A. Introduction
  • B. Conceptual implications
  • C. Practical implications
  • 1. Corresponding legal approaches
  • 2. Complementary legal approaches
  • D. Constitutional implications
  • E. Institutional implications
  • 1. Conceptualizing cooperative enforcement
  • 2. Mitigating risks carried by multifactored missions
  • 1.1 The problem with expanded prerogatives
  • 1.2 Mitigation strategies
  • F. Implications for other jurisdictions
  • G. Conclusions
  • Final Reflections
  • Bibliography
  • Index.